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The medieval origins of the „financial revolution‟ in government borrowing: usury and rentes  
The establishment of permanent funded national debts in many European 
states from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, often collectively called the 
‗financial revolution‘, owed their true origin to a much earlier medieval innovation 
in the public finances of medieval Flemish and Artesian towns, from the 1220s, 
which in turn was a response to the Church‘s recent and much revivified anti-usury 
campaign. The essence of this so-called ‗financial revolution‘, in establishing a 
permanent funded national debt, requires a clarification of each of its three main 
components.2 First, it was ‗public‘ because the debt was the responsibility of the 
government itself, and not, as had so often been the case in medieval and early- 
modern Europe, the personal obligation of the prince. Second, this public debt was 
based not on loans, or on any other forms of borrowing, but instead on the sale of 
perpetual though redeemable annuities, a financial instrument that was called a rente 
(renten in Dutch) in the Netherlands, France, and Germany (but juros in Spain).3 
                                                          
1 I dedicate this essay to the late Professor Stephan (Larry) Epstein (1960-2007), of the London 
School of Economics and member of the Datini Institute‘s Comitato Scientifico, who had done so 
much to enlighten us about the state in late-medieval, early-modern Europe. See in particular, S.R. 
EPSTEIN, Freedom and Growth : the Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300-1750, London 2000. I also 
acknowledge support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada,  for 
research grants awarded in 1993-1996, 1996-1999, 1999-2003, 2003-2007, and 2007-11. 
2 For England, see in particular: P.G.M. DICKSON, The Financial Revolution in England : a Study in the 
Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756, London 1967; and also H. ROSEVEARE, The Financial Revolution, 
1660–1760, London 1991; and P. O‘BRIEN, Fiscal Exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European Rivals - 
From Civil War to Triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo, in The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 
1688–1914, P. O‘BRIEN, D. WINCH eds., Oxford 2002, pp. 245-265; P. O‘BRIEN, P. HUNT, The Rise of a 
Fiscal State in England, 1485-1815, in ―Historical Research‖, 66, 1993, pp. 129-176; P. O‘BRIEN, The 
Political Economy of British Taxation, in ―The Economic History Review‖, 2nd ser., 41, Feb. 1988, I, pp. 1-
32; J. BREWER, The Sinews of Powers: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783, Cambridge Mass. 1990. 
3 For the Netherlands and France, see J.D. TRACY, A Financial Revolution in the Habsburg 
Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in the County of Holland, 1515–1565, Berkeley-London 1985; The Rise of 
the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815, ed. R. BONNEY, Oxford 1999; J. MUNRO, The Medieval Origins of 
the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes, and Negotiability, in ―The International History Review‖, 25, Sept. 
2003, pp. 505-262; A Financial History of the Netherlands, M. ‗t HART, J. JONKER, J. LUITEN VAN 
ZANDEN eds., Cambridge 1997; M. ‗t HART, ―The Devil or the Dutch”: Holland‟s Impact on the Financial 
Revolution in England, 1643-1694, in ―Parliaments, Estates and Representatives‖, 11 , June 1991, pp. 39-
52; W. FRITSCHY, A “Financial Revolution” Revisited: Public Finance in Holland During the Dutch Revolt, 1568 
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Because these rentes or annuities were perpetual obligations (unless the state chose 
to redeem them), the public debt was ‗permanent‘ – in stark contrast to earlier 
forms of state borrowing, which were almost always very short-term, and usually 
with a specific maturity date. Finally, that public debt was ‗funded‘ in the sense that 
the governments concerned formally authorized (usually by legislation) the use of  
specific excise or consumption taxes to make the annual annuity payments and, 
when necessary, to redeem these annuities or rentes. 
Whether the issue is medieval or more modern forms of European public 
finance, and related forms of taxation, historians may justly assume one constant: 
that the primary if not exclusive reason for such public borrowing was financing 
either warfare or the military defence of the state. Although financing public works 
may have played a relatively greater role in late-medieval urban finances, the costs 
of urban defence were still almost always a major issue. Certainly in the late-
medieval and early-modern Low Countries, the towns were also responsible for 
their share of the costs for territorial defences of the feudal principalities in this 
region (subsequently unified as the Habsburg Netherlands). 
That English historians have so frequently used the term ‗financial revolution‘ 
to refer their own country‘s establishment of a permanent funded debt between 
1693 and 1752, itself a product of both the Glorious Revolution (1688) and of wars 
more costly than England had ever before fought, implies that England had 
initiated this financial innovation, and during this very era.4 James Tracy, however, 
has demonstrated beyond any question that, as a system of national public finance, 
this so-called ‗financial revolution‘, i.e., one based on the sale of rentes or annuities, 
was to be found much earlier, in the sixteenth-century Habsburg Netherlands, and 
                                                          
- 1648, in ―The Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 56, Feb. 2003, pp. 57-89. For France, See R. 
BONNEY, The King's Debts : Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661, Oxford 1981; P. T. HOFFMAN, G. 
POSTEL-VINAY, and J.-L. ROSENTHAL, Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-
1870, Chicago 2000; D. WEIR, Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688 - 1789, 
in ―The Journal of Economic History,‖ 49, Mar. 1989, pp. 95-124; F. VELDE and D. WEIR, The 
Financial Market and Government Debt Policy in France, 1746 - 1793, in ―The Journal of Economic 
History‖, 52 , 1992, pp. 1-39. For nineteenth-century European public finance based on annuities or 
rentes (not bonds, despite the title), see N. FERGUSON, Political Risk and the International Bond Market 
between the 1848 Revolution and the Outbreak of the First World War, in ―The Economic History Review‖, 
2nd ser., 59, Feb. 2006, pp. 70-112. For Spain (Aragon-Catalonia and Castile), see n. 6 below. 
4 See the sources in n. 2, above. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the overthrow of 
James II (1685-88), Parliament invited William III of Orange, the Stadhouder of the (Dutch) United 
Provinces, to rule jointly as William III (r. 1689-1702) with his wife Mary (r. 1689-1694), the daughter 
and heir of James II. But William brought with him his ongoing war with Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) of 
France, a war that England was then ill equipped to finance. The culmination of the English ‗Financial 
Revolution‘ was ‗Pelhams‘ Conversion‘ (1749-1757) by which the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir 
Henry Pelham consolidated all of the outstanding issues of the now British public debt, chiefly in 
perpetual annuities, in the Consolidated Stock of the Nation (Consols), which trade to this day on the 
London Stock Exchange. See the very influential article on the role of the Glorious Revolution: D. 
NORTH, B. WEINGAST, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century Britain, in ―The Journal of Economic History‖, 49, Dec. 1989, pp. 803–832; and see 
recent attacks on their views in: N. SUSSMAN, Y. YAFEH, Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and 
Sovereign Debt: Britain, 1690 - 1790, in ―The Journal of Economic History‖, 66, Dec. 2006, pp. 882-905; 
D. STASAVAGE, Partisan Politics and Public Debt: The Importance of the “Whig Supremacy” for Britain‟s Financial 
Revolution, in ―The European Review of Economic History‖, 11, April 2007, pp. 123-153. 
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was then transmitted to England from the Dutch ‗Republic of the United 
Provinces‘.5 One might cavil, however, that in the Habsburg Netherlands this form 
of public finance was still the responsibility of the provincial governments, and that 
a stronger ‗national‘ case could be made for Habsburg Spain, from at least the reign 
of Emperor Charles V (whose Empire included the Netherlands).6 Nevertheless, 
the issue is not the actual form of the government so responsible but the nature of 
this form of public finance; and in that respect, Tracy, Van Werveke, and several 
other historians had noted that public civic borrowing based on the sale of 
rentes/renten was being practised in the towns of northern France (chiefly Artois) 
and Flanders from at least the 1220s, albeit on a small scale.7 
The thirteenth-century anti-usury campaigns: usury as a mortal sin against Natural Law 
What none had noted, however, was the role of the anti-usury campaign in 
instigating or promoting this quite revolutionary form of medieval public finance, 
for reasons that have to be found in a brief examination of the medieval usury 
doctrine, as it had evolved by the thirteenth century. Because the usury doctrine 
itself goes back to the very earliest days of the Christian Church, in many respects 
one inherited from Greek, Roman, and Jewish civilisations, one may argue that it 
had always provided a hindrance to any European governments, whether those of 
towns or principalities, that had sought to meet their financial obligations by 
borrowing. But, until the full evolution of the usury doctrine and especially before 
the consequent intensification in the anti-usury campaign in the early thirteenth 
century, this doctrine had been more of a nuisance than a real obstacle in public 
borrowing.  
Certainly the concept of ‗usury‘ and the full evolution of the doctrine have both 
been misunderstood by a majority of historians. Before the sixteenth century, the 
term usury had never meant excessive interest: it meant any interest at all, any 
payment beyond the actual loan, beyond the principal sum that had been borrowed 
(except under very special and narrow circumstances).8 Nor, contrary to many 
views, did usury apply only to so-called consumption loans. Nevertheless, if the 
                                                          
5 J. TRACY, A Financial Revolution, cit. ; IDEM, Taxation and State Debt, in Handbook of European 
History, 1500-1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, T. BRADY, H. OBERMAN, J. TRACY 
eds., I-II, Leiden 1994-95, I, Structures and Assertions, pp. 563-588; J. TRACY, On the Dual Origins of Long-
Term Urban Debt in Medieval Europe, in Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in 
Western Europe, 14th-18th Centuries, K. DAVIDS, M. BOONE, P. JANSSENS eds., Turnout 2003, pp. 13-26; J. 
TRACY, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics, 
Cambridge 2002. 
6 See the arguments in J. MUNRO, The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution, cit., pp. 505-562. 
For Spain, see Y. ROUSTIT, La consolidation de la dette publique à Barcelone au milieu du XIVe siècle, in 
―Estudios de historia moderna‖, 4, 1954, 2, pp. 15-156; J. GELABERT, Castile: 1504-1808, in The Rise of 
the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815, ed. R. BONNEY, Oxford 1999, pp. 207-212; G. TORTELLA, F. 
COMÍN, Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Spain (1600-1900), in Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old to 
the New World: Monetary and Financial Institutions in the 17th Through the 19th Centuries, M. BORDO, R. 
CORTÉS-CONDÉ eds., Cambridge 2002, pp. 140-148. 
7 See n. 3 above, and nn. 31-37 below. 
8 For these circumstances see J. MUNRO, Origins of the Financial Revolution, cit., pp. 506-513. 
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actual meaning of the tem had not changed, the severity of ecclesiastical opposition 
to usury had evolved: first, from a sin condemned when practised by the clergy to 
one practised by any Christian (thus it did not apply to Jews); from a sin against 
charity to a sin against justice, and finally to a truly mortal sin against Natural Law – 
and thus a sin directly against God Himself. 
The core of the Scholastic usury doctrine: the Roman law concept of the loan as a mutuum 
The core argument against usury was one based firmly on Roman Law, whose 
codification took place during the reign of Emperor Justinian I (527 - 565 CE).9 
Derived from Roman concepts of property rights, the essential Roman Law 
principle concerning a loan was the following: that the ownership of the money in a 
loan contract, in effect the ownership of the capital and thus of all the property 
rights attached to the use of that capital, was transferred from the lender, as the 
original owner, to the borrower, who became the sole owner for the entire duration 
of the loan contract. Given the very great importance that medieval European 
society continued to give to the Justinian Code, it was included in the earliest 
compilation of canon law, the Concordia discordantium canonum, commonly known as 
Gratian‘s Decretum, compiled between 1130 and 1140.10 
That principle can well be seen in the very exact term for a loan, found in both 
Roman and medieval Latin, and thus the term used in both the Justinian Code and 
Gratian‘s canon-law Decretum: the mutuum – literally, ‗what was thine becomes mine‘. 
Consequently, usury was a sin, well beyond any concept of violating Christian 
principles concerning charity, because it was theft of property; and that concept – 
‗usury as theft‘ – can be found in virtually all later-medieval Scholastic and canon 
law literature. Indeed, it can be found even before the publication of the Justinian 
Code, as early as the fourth century, in a statement attributed to Bishop St. 
Ambrose of Milan (339-97): ‗if someone takes usury, he commits violent robbery 
[rapina], and he shall not live‘. That seemingly harsh view is, in fact, based on very 
                                                          
9 The codification of Roman law under Emperor Justinian I (527 - 565 CE). Chiefly compiled by 
the lawyer Tribonian, the Corpus iuris civilis consists of: the Code (12 books) in 528-29; the Digest (50 
books) and Institutes (4 books) of 529-33; and the Novellae post codicem constitutiones, most of which were 
completed by Tribonian‘s death, in 542. Note that, for Roman citizens, usury – lending money for a 
specified rate of interest – had been prohibited by the Lex Genucia, in 342 BCE. Under Roman law, 
mutuum contracts themselves could therefore not specify interest, and permitted the repayment only of 
the exact sum lent; but Roman law did permit auxiliary contracts (stipulatio) to specify interest 
payments under certain conditions, with supposedly ‗moderate‘ interest rates. O. LANGHOLM, 
Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury According to the Paris Theological 
Tradition, 1200-1350, Leiden-New York 1992 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des 
Mittelalters, 19), p. 37; J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Cambridge Mass. 1957, pp. 22-33, 
39-40, 51-81. 
10 Decretum Gratiani D. 88, c.11, cited in O.LANGHOLM, The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury, Bergen-
Oslo-New York 1984, pp. 71-72. The Decretum also incorporated decrees of the Second Lateran 
Council (1139). Though not officially sanctioned by the papacy of this era, it ‗became the first part of 
the body of canon law in the law curriculum‘; and it was finally ratified as part of the Corpus iuris 
canonici by Pope Gregory XIII in the Roman edition of 1582. See Kenneth Pennington, ‗Gratian‘, in 
Dictionary of the Middle Ages, I-XIII, J. STRAYER et al. eds., V, New York 1985, pp. 656-658. 
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similar words in Ezekiel, in the Old Testament.11 And similar if less harsh views can 
also be found in the fifth-century ecclesiastical palea Ejiciens. Both St. Ambrose‘s 
brutal stricture and this palea are quoted, with a strong emphasis on their 
importance, in Gratian‘s Decretum. Furthermore, as early as 1165, the Bolognese 
canon lawyer Paucapalea had correlated the Justinian Code entries on the mutuum 
with Gratian‘s entry on usura in the Decretum; and, in 1187, Huguccio, an even more 
renowned Bolognese canon lawyer, had explicitly enunciated the arguments on the 
transfer of ownership rights in a mutuum to justify the usury doctrine.12 If not yet 
fully a sin against natural law, usury was, in this context of ownership rights, a sin 
against commutative justice – the equality of exchange – in that the lender, in 
exacting usury (interest), had received a greater value on the redemption of the loan 
than he had originally given. 
Indeed, that principle on the ownership of capital still remains valid in modern 
financial jurisprudence, and provides the fundamental distinction between equity 
investments and loan investments. That, in essence, also explains why the only 
investment contract that the Church found to be sinful, as usury, was the mutuum or 
loan contract, while the Church always readily accepted both profit and rent as fully 
licit returns on any equity investments. For, obviously those who invested in 
partnership contracts or commenda contracts in some commercial enterprise or 
venture always fully retained the ownership of their capitals so invested.13 The very 
same was true of anyone who, having invested in physical property, then lent the 
use of that property (land, buildings, animals, etc.), receiving in return a rental 
income.  
The Role of Aristotle: Natural Law and the „sterility of money‟ 
It is now a commonplace in the literature to ascribe the full fruition of the 
medieval Scholastic usury doctrine to the thirteenth-century reintroduction of 
Aristotle‘s principal treatises: first, the Nichomachean Ethics, translated from Greek 
into Latin, in 1246-47, and revised in the 1260s, when, second, his renowned 
                                                          
11 O. LANGHOLM, Legacy of Scholasticism, cit., p. 59: ‗Si quis usuram accipit, rapinam facit; vita non 
vivit‘. See Ezekiel 18.13: He who ‗hath given forth upon usury, and hath taken increase: shall he live? 
He shall not live .. he shall surely die‘. The Holy Bible: King James Version (1611), p. 711. 
12 See O. LANGHOLM, Legacy of Scholasticism, cit., p. 59; IDEM, Aristotelian Analysis, cit., pp. 71-72. 
13 In typical and traditional partnership contracts from Graeco-Roman times, each partner was 
entitled to a share of the profits that was in proportion to their individual capital investments; and 
they were similarly liable for losses and debts, in the same proportion, but legally subjected to 
unlimited liability. In the typical commenda contract, which was always drawn up for only one maritime 
venture (and did not apply to land-based trade), in which one partner supplied all the capital, and the 
other partner supplied all the enterprise and labour, the investor received 75 percent of the profits and 
thus the active sea-going merchants received only 25 percent. If the venture was a failure, without any 
profit, the investor received nothing, but he also enjoyed ‗limited liability‘ in that he was not liable for 
any of the losses, debts, or other liabilities that the active sea-going merchant had incurred in this or in 
any other related ventures. See Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents Illustrative 
Documents Translated with Introductions and Notes, RS. LOPEZ, I. RAYMOND eds, New York-London 1955 
(Records of Civilization, Sources, and Studies, 51), Part III: ‗Commercial Contracts and Commercial 
Investments‘, pp. 157-238. 
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treatise on Politics was also translated. Both works had a most profound influence 
on the two major theologians of this era: St. Albert the Great, or Albertus Magnus 
(b. 1193 or 1206 - d. 1280), and his most famous student, St. Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274).14 The importance of Aristotle‘s treatises for the usury doctrine was 
based on the assumption that money, in the natural order, had only one function: 
as a medium of exchange. From that premise flowed two essential components of 
the medieval usury doctrine: first, the concept of the ‗sterility of money‘, and 
second, the concept that, because of that essential sterility, usury was a sin against 
Natural Law, as can be seen in this quotation from his Politics: 15 
The most hated sort [of money-making], and with the greatest reason, is usury, which 
makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of it. For money was intended 
to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term usury [τόκος], which 
means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring 
resembles the parent. Whereof of all modes of making money this is the most unnatural. 
Nevertheless, one must clearly recognize that the true and fundamental basis of 
the usury doctrine, concerning the transfer of ownership of money in the mutuum 
loan contract, long predated the reintroduction of Aristotle‘s treatises into western 
Europe. Furthermore, Aristotle‘s ‗sterility of money‘ argument did not subsequently 
become the major feature of usury doctrine, for many theologians and canon 
lawyers came to recognize that ‗money‘, as investment capital, is not in fact ‗sterile‘. 
But the ‗sterility of money‘ concept had the great virtue of being so easy for the 
public to grasp, when the Church and its agents conducted a much more intense 
anti-usury campaign in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.  
Finally, St. Thomas Aquinas himself made another major contribution to the 
anti-usury doctrine by resolving any lingering doubts about the differences between 
usury, in lending money, and rent, in lending property, by distinguishing between the role 
of fungibles and non-fungibles in such a loan (mutuum), without specific references 
to the core issue of the ownership of capital. Money (coins), and similar fungibles, 
such as wine and grain, were necessarily totally consumed (and in St. Thomas‘s 
view, destroyed) in their use, so that repayment, or redemption of the loan, 
necessarily involved their replacement with different but exactly identical objects, 
i.e., objects of essentially identical value.16 Nobody – or very few — would 
rationally borrow money (coins) in order to hoard it; and, as Aristotle had 
stipulated, money had only one use: as a medium of exchange, a mechanism of 
payment in trade. In contrast, the repayment of a loan of non-fungibles – such as 
the leasing of property, buildings, farm animals, etc. – involved not their 
                                                          
14 See in particular J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, cit., pp. 38-39, 52-53. 
15 The Politics of Aristotle: Translated Into English, I-II, trans. and ed. B. JOWETT, I, Introduction and 
Translation, Oxford 1885, p. 19: Politics, Book I.10. 1258b. For similar views on the Nichomachean 
Ethics, see O.LANGHOLM, Aristotelian Analysis of Usury, cit., pp. 5-21, 54-61; IDEM, The Legacy of 
Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power, Cambridge-New York 1998, pp. 21-22. 
16 That did involve some problems that only a few theologians recognized: namely, the 
repayment of loans, made in silver coins, with debased silver coins of the same nominal value but 
therefore of inferior real value. On this important but neglected issue, see TH. SARGENT, F. VELDE, 
The Big Problem of Small Change, Princeton-Oxford 2002, pp. 69-99. 
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replacement but the return of the very same objects, which were, in their use, 
subject to ‗wear and tear‘, thus further justifying the fully licit payment of rent.  
At the same time, however, one may note that, since rents were also calculated 
on the basis of time – so much rent per month or year – another common 
Scholastic argument, namely, that ‗usury was the Theft of Time, which belongs to 
God alone‘, was clearly illogical. The utility of that argument was, however, that it 
clearly also appealed more to laymen, and especially to the large mass of the 
uneducated public, as a much more readily understandable and thus convincing 
explanation of why usury was truly a mortal sin. 
The anti-usury campaign: the role of Lateran Councils and the mendicant preaching orders 
The origins of the revived and indeed harshly vigorous (almost virulent) 
‗campaign against usury‘, which was to prove so important in altering the character 
of medieval urban public finances, had begun almost a full century before the re-
introduction of Aristotle‘s treaties and the publication of St. Thomas Aquinas‘ 
Summa Theologica (ca. 1265-74). One may well contend that this campaign had begun 
with the Third Lateran Council of 1179, which, after endorsing all of the Second 
Lateran Councils prohibitions against usury (1139), issued the formal sanction or 
penalty of excommunication – i.e., complete banishment from the Church – for all 
usurers who did not repent and restore their ill-gotten ‗stolen‘ gains. It also forbade 
them to receive a Christian burial if they ‗died in sin‘, as unrepentant usurers.17 
The next and Fourth Lateran Council, of 1215, apart from reiterating all of the 
prohibitions against usury, and the prescribed punishments for this sin, provided 
two additional features of great importance. First, it issued a vicious, excoriating 
diatribe against Jews, for their supposed ‗treachery‘ and ‗cruel oppression‘ in 
extorting ‗oppressive and excessive interest‘, in engaging in licensed pawn 
broking.18 The prohibitions against usury, it must be noted, applied only to 
Christians; and the only non-Christians in western Europe who were able to engage 
in lending were Jews.19 While both ecclesiastical and secular regulations did limit the 
                                                          
17 J. GILCHRIST, The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages, New York 1969, pp. 182-183: 
Canon 25: ‗Seeing that almost everywhere the crime of usury has taken such hold that many pass over 
other professions to devote themselves to the business of usury, as if it were lawful, and thus 
disregard the strict scriptural prohibition, we decree that notorious [publicly known] usurers are not to 
be admitted to the communion of the altar, nor, if they die in that sin, to receive Christian burial.‘ 
18 See Constitution 67, from the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), translated and published in J. 
GILCHRIST, Church and Economic Activity, cit., pp. 182-183, in particular this passage: ‗The more that 
Christians are restrained from the practice of usury, the more are they oppressed in this matter by the 
treachery of the Jews, so that in a short time they will exhaust the resources of Christians...‘; and thus, 
‗we ordain in this decree that if in the future ... Jews extort from Christians oppressive and excessive 
interest, the society of Christians shall be denied them until they have made suitable satisfaction for 
their excesses‘. This passage is evidently a source of the common erroneous view that the Church 
opposed only ‗excessive‘ interest. 
19 The Muslim presence was almost non-existent, especially in commerce and finance; and, in any 
event, Muslims themselves were prohibited by the Koran from usurious lending practices (the Arabic 
term is raba). See H. SOLOVEITCHIK, Usury, Jewish Law, and S. WARD, Usury, Islamic Law, both in 
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interest rates that Jewish money-lenders were allowed to charge, sometimes the 
legal limit interest reached 25 percent (reflecting the high risk factor of non-
payment): or up to 43.33 percent in pawnbroking (2d per pound per week: 
104/240d).20 By so associating Jewish money-lenders with usury, the Council 
certainly made it appear to be all the more a heinous, and not just mortal, sin to a 
largely anti-Semitic public. And thus these provisions proved to be a very powerful 
weapon in the new revival of the anti-usury campaign. Second, the Fourth Lateran 
Council made annual confessions obligatory for all; and that of course meant 
confessions of usury, another powerful weapon for what became the prime agency 
for the anti-usury campaign: the new mendicant preaching orders. 
The first of these was the Order of Friars Minor or Franciscans (St. Francis of 
Assisi), founded c.1206-10; and the second was the Order of Friars Preacher or 
Dominicans (St. Dominic), founded in 1216, the very year after Lateran IV. Of the 
two, the Dominicans became the even more hostile foe of usury. In the thirteenth 
century they would boast such leading theologians in the anti-usury campaigns as 
St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas.21 Obviously the far more powerful 
agents in this campaign were those mendicant friars who were sent out to preach to 
the chiefly illiterate and uneducated public. Not content with the formal statements 
and strictures issue by the Lateran Councils, the Dominican and Franciscan friars 
concocted their own lurid exempla – diabolic and utterly horrifying stories about the 
ghastly fates awaiting usurers in the eternal fires of Hell, thereby convincing most 
of the public that usurers were amongst the very worst of all evildoers.22 That 
usurers so richly deserved this horrid fate was certainly the view of the famed 
Florentine Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), who, in his Commedia (Divine Comedy), 
placed usurers in the lower depths of Hell, the Seventh Circle (Inferno), as ‗the last 
class of sinners that are punished in the burning sands‘.23 In their inflammatory 
preaching, with such enormous public appeal, the mendicant preachers also 
                                                          
Dictionary of the Middle Ages, J. STRAYER, et al. eds., XII, New York 1989, pp. 339-341. Jewish law, 
however, permitted exacting usury from gentiles. See n. 11, above (Ezekiel 18:13). 
20 On licensed Jewish money-lenders, see J. SHATZMILLER, Shylock Reconsidered: Jews, Moneylending, 
and Medieval Society, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1990); and M. BOTTICINI, A Tale of “Benevolent” 
Governments: Private Credit Markets, Public Finance, and the Role of Jewish Lenders in Medieval and Renaissance 
Italy, in ―The Journal of Economic History‖, 60, Mar. 2000, pp. 164-189; D. BORNSTEIN, Law, Religion, 
and Economics: Jewish Moneylenders in Christian Cortona, in A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of 
Law and Society in Italy and Spain, J. MARINO, T. KUEHN eds., Toronto 2003, pp. 241-256. In late 
thirteenth-century Flanders, Lombards (northern Italians) were also allowed to engage in pawn-
broking, at rates up to 18 percent. See R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges: 
Italian Merchant Bankers, Lombards, and Money-Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking, Cambridge Mass. 
1948, pp. 99-148. 
21 See J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, cit., pp. 38-39, 52-53; R. MCINERY, Aquinas, St. 
Thomas‘ in Dictionary of the Middle Ages, J. STRAYER et al. eds, I, New York 1982, pp. 353-366. 
22 See in particular, J. LE GOFF, The Usurer and Purgatory, in The Dawn of Modern Banking, ed. 
CENTER FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES, UCLA, New Haven 1979, pp. 29-34, contending 
that the friars linked usurers ‗with the worst evildoers, the worst occupations, the worst sins, and the 
worst vices‘. 
23 Canto XVII of Inferno, in D. ALIGHIERI, The Divine Comedy, Carlyle-Okey-Wicksteed translation, 
ed. C.H. GRANDAGENT, New York 1950 (Modern Library Editions), p. 93. Set in the year 1300, it was 
probably written between 1304 and 1321. 
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convinced secular governments of their God-ordained duty to enforce the usury 
ban vigorously during the later Middle Ages.24  
Finally, the mendicant preaching orders and others engaged in the anti-usury 
campaign received much valued additional support from the famous Decretales that 
Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) issued in 1234.25 Amongst its many detailed 
provisions are the following: that usurers were forever to be classed as infames: 
ineligible to hold public office, honours, or to testify in court. To enforce that 
provision, all princes were commanded to expel usurers from their realms and 
never readmit them; and landlords were forbidden to rent property to those lending 
money at interest. Indeed, clerics who permitted Church burials of usurers were to 
be classed as usurers themselves. The wills and testaments of usurers were to be 
held invalid; and the heirs of usurers who failed to make restitutions were also to be 
held as usurers and infames.  
Well before Gregory IX‘s issue of these Decretales – which really just confirmed 
and codified the Church‘s now well established doctrines – and not long after the 
establishment of the two mendicant preaching orders, the anti-usury campaign had 
already borne fruit in a very fundamental change in urban public finances: with the 
first successful issue of rentes, in the 1220s. 
The origins and evolution of the rente contracts 
As indicated above, the vital importance of the rente contract in the medieval 
‗financial revolution‘, involving urban public finances, was its essential character: 
that it was not a loan, or any other related form of borrowing, even though it did 
indeed constitute part of the public debt. Instead, it represented the town 
government‘s sale of a future steam of urban income that was paid to the purchaser 
in return for a lump sum of capital, paid in full at the time of purchase. This 
peculiar form of public finance has no known antecedent in the ancient world. It 
first appears in private rather than public finance: as a census contract that some 
Carolingian monasteries had been issuing from about the early eighth century. In 
order to secure bequests of lands from the laity, monasteries had guaranteed the 
donor that, in return for surrendering all property rights to the land, the donor 
would receive an annual usufruct income (redditus) from the lands donated, i.e., 
‗fruits‘ of that property, delivered either in ‗kind‘, as a share of the harvest, or later, 
more commonly in money, for the rest of his or her life, and sometimes also for the 
                                                          
24 See J. LE GOFF, Purgatory, cit., pp. 29-34. No longer would one find open and direct references to interest 
payments that had been fairly common in commercial contracts of the twelfth century. For Genoese examples, see 
Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean, cit., no. 66, pp. 158-159 (Genoa, 16 July 1161), and n. 13 above; and Business 
Contracts of Medieval Provence: Selected Notulae from the Cartulary of Giraud Amalric of Marseilles, 1248, ed. J. PRYOR, 
Toronto 1981 (PIMS, Studies and Texts, 54). 
25 For a good summary of the usury doctrine and the related clerical punishments, see J. 
BRUNDAGE, Usury, in Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 12, New York 1989, pp. 335-339. See also L. 
ARMSTRONG, Usury, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, J. MOKYR et al. eds., I-V, New York 
2003, 5, pp. 183-185. 
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lives of designated heirs.26 Because that annual income was quite obviously deemed 
to be part of the rental value of the land, the census contract more commonly came 
to be known as a rente, from which the now common financial term rentier has been 
derived.27  
In the realm of medieval private finance, that Carolingian contract developed 
into two somewhat different contracts: (1) the bail à rente, more closely related to 
the Carolingian contract: the sale of real estate or some form of immobile property 
in return for a perpetual annual income (normally hereditary); and its variant, (2) the 
constitution de rente, also known as the rente à prix d‟argent: by which a property holder 
sold, for a specified lump sum of money, the right to receive a fixed annual income 
from his property or other real assets, though the property itself remained under his 
ownership.28 Long before its use in public finance, this contract had become a 
widespread vehicle for private investment in the agricultural economies of 
Mediterranean western Europe (Italy and Aragon in particular): one by which small 
peasant landholders received needed capital by ‗selling‘ such contracts to wealthy 
bourgeois merchants and financiers, who received in return this form of perpetual 
rente income.29 The property-holding seller or issuer of the rente contract was known 
as the débirentier, who normally pledged all of his goods and assets to meet the 
annual payment, on penalty of forfeiture; and the buyer of the contract, the one 
receiving the future stream of income, was known as the crédirentier. The transfer of 
this contract to the realm of public finance meant that the city government 
assumed the role of the débirentier seller or issuer of the rentes (and, in theory at least, 
similarly obliged to pledge urban assets as collateral for the annuity payments). 
Those towns that sold or issued these rente contracts used, from the very 
beginning, two distinct forms: (1) perpetual hereditary rents, known as rentes 
                                                          
26 A.P. USHER, The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe, I, The Structure and 
Functions of the Early Credit System: Banking in Catalonia: 1240-1723, Cambridge Mass. 1943 (Harvard 
Economic Studies, 75; reissued New York 1967), p. 146, citing TH. SOMMERLAD, Die Wirtschaftliche 
Thätigkeit der deutschen Kirche, Leipzig 1905, II, p. 171: reference to Abbey of St. Gallen, 816 CE; J. 
TRACY, On the Dual Origins, cit., citing (p. 14) the seminal work of B. KUSKE, Das Schuldenwesen der 
deutschen Städte im Mittelalter, Tübingen 1904 (Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 
Ergänzungsheft, XII), pp. 12-24 (whose earliest example is for the Abbey of St. Gallen, in Hergau, 
‗um 700'). R. VAN UYTVEN, Stadsfinanciën en stadsekonmie te Leuven: van de XIIe tot het einde der XVIe eeuw, 
Brussels 1961, p. 196, citing M. VAN HAAFTEN, Lijfrente, in Winkler Prins Encyclopaedie, I-XVIII, 
Amsterdam 1947-54, XIII, p. 165 (footnote), had contended that the ancient Greek city state of 
Miletus (ca. 200 BCE) had used a similar census contract. But there is no evidence to substantiate this 
claim; and Van Haaften‘s revised entry on Lijfrente, in the Grote Winkler Prins, XII, Amsterdam-Brussels 
1971, pp. 351-352 does not repeat this unfounded assertion. 
27 See J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, cit., pp. 154-170 (quotation on p. 155). 
28 See B. SCHNAPPER, Les rentes au XVIe siècle: histoire d‟un instrument de crédit, Paris 1957 
(S.E.V.P.E.N, École Pratique des Hautes Études: Centre de recherches historiques: Affaires et gens 
d‘affaires, 12), pp. 50-61; H. VAN DER WEE, Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems, in The Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe, E.E. RICH, CH. WILSON eds., V, The Economic Organization of Early Modern 
Europe, Cambridge 1975, pp. 303-305. 
29 See D. HERLIHY, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia, 1200-1430, New Haven 1967, pp. 136-145, and 
Table 18, with graph 3: median price of a perpetual rent of one staio of wheat); p. 241 (church 
revenues in perpetual rents); Business Contracts of Medieval Provence: see censuales, cit., in notulae 55 (pp. 
168-171), 93 (pp. 230-231). 
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héritables (erfelijk renten, erfrenten, and later called losrenten, in Flemish/Dutch); and (2) 
life-rents, known as rentes viagères (French) and lijfrenten (Flemish), which were 
normally extinguished on the death of the holder. Some of the latter were issued, 
however, for two or three designated lives, i.e., to be transferred to a spouse, child, 
or some other close relative. Frequently the designated recipient of the annuity 
income was an infant, who thus earned income over a far longer life-span than that 
left to the actual investor. In general, through the centuries, the annual ‗annuity‘ 
payments on single life-rents, though always far lower than interest rates on 
voluntary short-term loans, were always much higher than those on perpetual or 
hereditary rents, sometimes double, perhaps reflecting the fact that the latter, by 
their very nature inheritable and also assignable, ultimately proved to be more 
marketable, certainly by the sixteenth century.30 
The first documented and successful urban sale of rentes took place in or just 
before 1228: at Troyes, one of the major towns of Champagne Fairs, which then 
governed the commerce between north-western Europe and Italy. That transaction 
involved the sale of a series of several rentes viagères to a group of Artesian financiers 
from Arras and St. Quentin.31 Subsequently, in December 1232, Troyes sold 
another set of 32 rentes viagères, 26 of them to Rheims financiers, who may have 
resold them to local citizens. Because a very important feature of this new form of 
public finance was its transferability, if by no means outright negotiability, we must 
note a very important feature of this transaction: that the buyers (crédirentiers) were 
explicitly permitted to sell their rentes to third parties. Furthermore, if they still held 
them on their death, some rentes were then, by contract provisions, to be transferred 
to wives (if they outlived the husbands), who were entitled to receive half of the 
annual income for the rest of their lifetime.32  
At almost the same time, in 1235, Auxerre also sold rentes viagères, chiefly also to 
Rheims financiers, whose town government was possibly also then selling rentes, 
despite some prior ecclesiastical opposition.33 While Arras, deemed to be the most 
important financial centre in northern France, may have sold rentes before this time, 
our earliest evidence comes only from the first extant financial accounts, for the 
period October 1241 to February 1244, which record the sale rentes viagères, with a 
total value of £2,500 parisis, for one or two lives. The ‗rate of return‘, the annual 
annuity payments, was reckoned at 1/6.5, which in modern terms means 15.38 
                                                          
30 See G. BIGWOOD, Le régime juridique et économique du commerce de l‟argent dans la Belgique du moyen 
âge, I-II, Brussels, 1921-22 (Academie Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres, XIV), I, pp. 120-123 ; J. 
MUNRO, Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution, cit., pp. 505-562; TRACY, A Financial Revolution, cit., 
pp. 108-138; H. VAN DER WEE, Anvers et les innovations de la technique financière aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, 
in ―Annales: ESC”, 22 , 1967, pp. 1067-1089, republished as Antwerp and the New Financial Methods of the 
16th and 17th Centuries, in H. VAN DER WEE, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World , trans. by 
Lizabeth Fackelman, Aldershot 1993 (Variorum Series), pp. 145-166; IDEM, Monetary, Credit, and 
Banking Systems, cit., pp. 290-393. 
31 J. TRACY, On the Dual Origins, cit., pp. 16, citing in particular (in n. 19) P. BOUGARD, C. 
WYFFELS, Les finances de Calais au XIIIe siècle, Brussels 1966. 
32 P. DESPORTES, Reims et les Rémois au XIIIe et XIVe siècles, Paris 1979, pp. 127-29; J. TRACY, On the 
Dual Origins, cit., pp. 16-17 (I am indebted to James Tracy to this reference). 
33 P. DESPORTES, Reims et les Rémois, cit., p. 128; similarly cited in J. TRACY, On the Dual Origins, 
cit., pp. 16-17. For the ecclesiastical opposition, see below, p. 986 and nn. 47-50. 
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percent; and the annual annuity payments accounted for almost 75 percent of 
Arras‘s expenditures in servicing its total debt during these years.34 Subsequently, 
many other northern French towns (Artesian, Picard, and Flemish) began issuing 
rentes from just after the mid-century: Douai, in or about 1250; Roye, in 1260; 
Calais, in 1263; Saint-Riquier, in 1268; and Saint-Omer, in 1271.35  
The relationship between urban rentes and the anti-usury campaign in the thirteenth century 
 What did this evidently important financial innovation in urban public 
finances, in the sale of the various rente contracts, have to do with the anti-usury 
campaign? The first direct evidence of such a link comes from an event that Pierre 
Desportes has recorded in his history of Rheims during the thirteenth century: that, 
in 1234, after ecclesiastical authorities, in so vigorously pursuing this campaign, 
threatened the Rheims bourgeoisie with dire consequences for their suspected 
‗usures‘, provoking a ‗véritable terreur‘, so much so that those who had been 
financing the town government quickly came to prefer ‗les achats de rentes aux 
prêts proprement dits‘.36 Furthermore, in 1254 Innocent IV relieved the monks of 
Saint-Rémi and the commune of Beauvais of any obligation to pay interest owing 
to their creditors, ‗notwithstanding their obligations‘.37 In his study of thirteenth-
century Flanders (both francophone and Flemish regions), Georges Bigwood 
asserted that ‗the struggle against usury was energetically and remorselessly 
conducted‘ by the Church, town governments (citing Douai, in particular, from 
1247), and the counts of both Flanders and Artois.38 To be sure, from 1281, Count 
Guy de Dampierre and successor counts of Flanders had licensed Italian ‗Lombard‘ 
merchants to maintain regulated pawn-broking ‗tables‘, with, to all appearances, 
interest charges contained in their transactions. But such pawn-broking could be 
interpreted as a discounted sale and repurchase of goods, rather than as genuine 
usury. Even so, Raymond de Roover has contended that ‗the lombards in Flanders 
as elsewhere lived in constant fear of a sudden reversion to repressive methods and 
                                                          
34 P. BOUGARD, L‟apogée de la ville (1191-1340), in IDEM, Y.-M. HILAIRE, A. NOLIBOS, Histoire 
d‟Arras, Arras 1988 (Collection Histoire des villes du Nord - Pas de Calais), pp. 61-62. J. TRACY, On the 
Dual Origins, cit., pp. 16-17 cites P. DESPORTES, Reims et les Rémois, cit., for a somewhat different figure 
of £2,610 parisis (a year). Note that in medieval Europe, percentages were always expressed as 
fractions. 
35 J. TRACY, On the Dual Origins, cit., pp.16-19; IDEM, Financial Revolution, pp. 13-15; H. VAN 
WERVEKE, De Gentsche stadsfinanciën in de middeleeuwen, Brussels 1934 (Koninklijke Academie voor 
Wetenschappen, Letteren, en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang, XXXIV), pp. 
164-171, 282-290. 
36 Quotation from P. DESPORTES, Reims et les Rémois, cit., pp. 126, and 131, also cited in J. TRACY, 
On the Dual Origins, cit., pp. 16-17. 
37 P. DESPORTES, Reims et les Rémois, cit., p. 126. 
38 G. BIGWOOD, Le régime juridique, cit.,  I, pp. 567-603. For example, in July 1288 the Synod at 
Liège excommunicated all manifest usurers and forbade acceptance of their donations (p. 580). Some 
of his views are challenged, but not entirely successfully, in C. WYFFELS, L‟usure en Flandre au XIIIe 
siècle, in ―Revue belge de philologie et d‘histoire/Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis”, 
69, 1991, 4, pp. 853-857. 
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under the permanent threat of expulsion and spoliation‘.39 David Nicholas has also 
observed that in the thirteenth century ‗the Flemings seem to have been more 
concerned than the Italians to avoid the imputation of usury‘.40  
The continuous risks of debt repudiation for ‗usurious‘ lenders was 
demonstrated during the financial crises that the Flemish towns were experiencing 
in the 1290s.41 In November 1291, the Parlement de Paris issued a formal decree 
cancelling Flemish communal debts deemed to be usurious ‗ou soupetenneuse 
d‘usure‘, while also stipulating the punishment of civic ‗administrateurs par lesquelz 
la commune aura estre dommagé‘ by such usuries.42 In February 1294, King Philip 
IV ordered his bailiffs in Ghent to take any measures necessary to protect the 
town‘s victims of ‗usurious transactions‘.43 Shortly after, in January 1296, Pope 
Boniface VIII, evidently under pressure from Philip IV, issued a decree to relieve 
Bruges from the ‗vicious usurious obligations‘ (per usurariam pravitatem de solvendis) 
owed to the prominent Arras financiers Robert and Baldwin Crespin, ‗beyond the 
principal sums owed to them‘.44 At the same time, Count Guy de Dampierre also 
appealed for papal assistance in releasing him from the ‗usurious loans‘ owed to 
these very same Arras bankers.45 
Quite possibly, as some may argue, the real purpose of these harsh measures 
was not to eliminate usury as such, but rather to enhance the ability of severely 
indebted town governments and princes to extort new loans at much lower rates of 
interest, with the implied threat of the renunciation or abrogation of existing loans. 
Such measures might have severely injured their ability to secure new financing – 
i.e., if potential lenders had refused to co-operate and to offer new loans – had the 
town governments and princes not had available that alternative source in the form 
of the relatively new rente contracts. If most investors were not as frightened and 
timid as those of Rheims had supposedly been in 1230s, to invest only in rentes, a 
fair proportion of them now probably preferred to hold a more balanced 
investment portfolio that consisted of both high-interest short term loans and rentes, 
                                                          
39 R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking, and Credi, cit., pp. 99-148; C. WYFFELS, L‟usure, cit., pp. 866-
867; G. BIGWOOD, Le régime juridique, cit., I, pp. 319-388, 639-648. In 1280-81, eight Yprois citizens 
and two Lombards were condemned for usury; but Lombards also lent funds to the towns, at rates up 
to 18 percent. See also n. 20 above. 
40 D. NICHOLAS, The Metamorphosis of a Medieval City: Ghent in the Age of the Arteveldes, 1302-1390 
Lincoln 1987, p. 122 (though referring in fact to fourteenth-century private transactions). 
41 See IDEM, Medieval Flanders, London-New York 1992, pp. 180-194. 
42 G. BIGWOOD, Le régime juridique, cit., II, doc. no. 17, pp. 299-300. 
43 Ibid., II, doc. no. 19, pp. 303-04 (26 Feb 1294): ‗plures pecuniarum quantitates extorquere 
nitantur per usurariam pravitatem‘. 
44 Ibid., I, pp. 578-83; vol. II, doc. no. 21, p. 306 (21 Jan 1296), imposing those penalties 
prescribed by the Lateran councils. 
45 G. BIGWOOD, Le régime juridique, cit., II, doc. no. 15, pp. 293-98, for a partial list of Count 
Guy‘s loans to the Crespin brothers. See also M. FRYDE, Public Credit, with Special Reference to North-
Western Europe, in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, III, Economic Organization in the Middle Ages, 
M. POSTAN et al. eds., Cambridge 1963, p. 495. 
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both life- and perpetual-rents, with much lower but both financially, legally, and 
morally ‗safer‘ rates of return.46  
These rentes were, of course, ‗safer‘ in these respects only if they were not 
deemed to be a subterfuge for usury. At the very beginning of their financial 
history, about 1220, the future of the rentes, in any form, did not look to be very 
secure. In 1218, in that very same city of Rheims, which later became so prominent 
in resorting to this new financial instrument, the city‘s Archbishop had forbidden 
the town (or the Hôtel-Dieu) to sell any rentes viagères for reasons that may have 
involved the usury question – though the document does not supply the actual 
reason.47 But if suspicions of usury were the issue, the Archbishop had no papal or 
canon-law authority to issue a ban on these grounds. As indicted earlier, Rheims‘ 
town government was evidently selling rentes, in lieu of accepting interest-bearing 
loans, during that bitter ecclesiastical anti-usury campaign of the 1230s, even if the 
licit nature of rentes still remained unclear. In the following decade, the Italian 
canonist Geoffrey of Trani (Gottofredo da Trani, d. 1245), who also taught at 
Bologna, levied the specific charge of usury against those purchased rentes, on the 
grounds that they were guilty of an ‗immoral hope‘ that the value of their annual 
annuity payments over time would exceed their costs in purchasing the rentes. 
Shortly after, about 1250, the Dominican canonist Guillaume de Rennes, in his 
gloss on the Summa of Raymond de Peñafort, agreed with Geoffrey that the rente 
contract was indeed immoral and illegitimate, even if not in itself intrinsically (ex 
forma) usurious.48 
The very next year (c. 1251), however, a fully contrary and official 
pronouncement came from the ultimate Christian source, the papacy, when 
Innocent IV (r. 1243-1254) declared that rentes were not loans but legitimate 
contracts of sale, and thus not usurious, provided that the annual payments were 
based on ‗real‘ properties and the income from such properties – a contentious 
issue that would not be fully resolved for two more centuries.49 Shortly after (c. 
1253), one of the most eminent theologians of the day, Henry of Susa (or 
Hostiensis, later Cardinal Archbishop of Ostia, 1261-1271) fully supported 
                                                          
46 See J. MUNRO, Medieval Origins, cit., pp. 220-245. 
47 P. DESPORTES, Reims et les Rémois , cit., pp. 127-28 and n. 226. The proposed sale of a rente 
viagère for £45 parisis, to Hugues, coûtre of the church of Rheims, for an annual payment of 50 sols 
parisis (thus: 5.55 percent). 
48 GEOFFREY OF TRANI (Goffredo da Trani), Summa super titulis decretalium. For this and other 
canonical sources, I am indebted to L. ARMSTRONG, Usury and Public Debt in Early Renaissance Florence: 
Lorenzo Ridolfi on the Monte Comune, Toronto 2003 (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies 
and Texts, 144), pp. 53-84, and p. 400. See also L. ARMSTRONG, The Politics of Usury in Trecento 
Florence: The Questio de Monte of Francesco da Empoli, in ―Mediaeval Studies”, 61, 1999, pp. 1-44. 
49 INNOCENT IV, Apparatus seu commentaria super libris quinque decretalium, ad X 5.19.6, In Civitate, 
Frankfurt 1570; reprinted Frankfurt 1968. See F. VERAJA, Le origini della controversia teologica sul contratto 
di censo nel 13 secolo, Rome 1960 (Storia ed economia, 7), pp. 30-43; B. SCHNAPPER, Les rentes chez les 
théologiens, cit., pp. 966-967; and PH. GODDING, Wilhelmi Bont Lovaniensis de redditibus perpetuis et ad vitam 
(1451), in ―Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis/Revue d‘histoire du droit/The Legal History Review‖, 
58, 2000, pp. 261-262; O. LANGHOLM, Economics in the Medieval Schools, cit., p. 97. 
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Innocent IV, in a carefully constructed treatise that  rejected all of Geoffrey of 
Trani‘s arguments against the rentes.50  
Nevertheless, their views had not yet gained universal acceptance. For, in 1276, 
Henry of Ghent, the leading theologian in the Paris faculty, reiterated Geoffrey of 
Trani‘s views that rentes promised gains well beyond the principal sum, especially 
perpetual rentes, offering the purchaser ‗immoral hopes of gain‘. In any event, he 
further contended, the sale of rentes was in actuality the ‗sale of money [itself], which 
is non-vendible‘.51 But even within his own University of Paris, Henry of Ghent 
found no support; for by this time, almost all theologians had accepted the contrary 
view: that the census or rente contract was a fully licit agreement of ‗purchase and 
sale‘ (emptio in forma) of future streams of income or usufruct from property, 
provided that Innocent IV‘s stipulations were fully observed.52 In the late thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries, numerous Scholastic treatises – inter alia, from 
Gervais de Mont Saint-Eloi, Matthew d‘Aquasparta, Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard 
of Middleton, and Alexander Lombard – fully endorsed the census and the various 
related rente contracts.53  
The governing principle of this theological discussion was that, since the census 
and rente contracts had no provisions for repayment, as did the mutuum (and on a 
stipulated date), they were – to repeat the point made earlier — not true loan 
contracts, the sole form of usury. As the later theologian Leonardius Lessius 
contended, ubi non est mutuum, ibi non est usura (‗where there is no loan, there is no 
usury‘).54 Thus, in full accordance with that principle, anyone who purchased a rente, 
i.e., the crédirentier, could never ever demand redemption – repayment of the 
principal sum – so long as the seller or débirentier continued to honour the 
obligation to make the annual annuity payments. For, if such redemption rights 
were ever granted, their rentes would be nothing more than a devious and most 
sinful device to cloak a usurious loan. Otherwise, any crédirentier who wished to 
                                                          
50 F. VERAJA, Origini della controversia, cit., pp. 43-47: Summa aurea or Summa super titulis 
decretalium (ca. 1253); and Commentaria in V librum decretalium, ad X.5.19.6, In civitate (ca. 1270). 
51 F. VERAJA, Origini della controversia, cit., pp., 50-52, 55-81, 106-11, 125-31; B. SCHNAPPER, Les 
rentes chez les théologiens, cit., pp. 969-72; O. LANGHOLM, Economics in the Medieval Schools, cit., pp. 249-
273. Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) had issued his Quodlibets in response to questions from the Flemish 
Beguines on the morality of investing in rentes. He advised them to use their funds instead to purchase 
real estate or other property that they could then lease out for annual rents, to achieve the same 
financial goals. 
52 In 1278, almost immediately after Henry of Ghent has issued his Quodlibets, Giles of Lessines 
justified the return on census contracts in this very same context. See F. VERAJA, Origini della controversia, 
cit., pp. 89-99; J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, cit., pp. 155-157; O. LANGHOLM, Economics of 
Medieval Schools, pp. 310-317. 
53 F. VERAJA, Origini della controversia, cit., pp. 69-73, 101-124, 131-162; and conclusions, pp. 163-
195; B. SCHNAPPER, Les rentes chez les théologiens, cit., pp. 969-972; O. LANGHOLM, Economics in the 
Medieval Schools, cit., p. 283; J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, cit., pp. 154-170. 
54 LEONARDUS LESSIUS (Theologian at the University of Leuven, 1554-1623), De justitia et jure, 
Paris 1606, Liber 2, cap. 21, dub 2, n. 9, cited in R. DE ROOVER, Leonardius Lessius als economist: de 
economische leerstellingen en van de latere scholastiek in de Zuikdelijke Nederlanden, Brussels 1969 (Mededelingen 
van Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der 
Letteren, XXXI), p. 11; and on renten, p. 26. 
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regain some or all of the principal had to find some third party willing to buy the 
rente, with its annual income, but often at some discount.55 As noted earlier, from 
the beginning, rentes, or more specifically perpetual rents, and the annuity and other 
privileges attached to them, could be sold and transferred to third parties, though 
full and legally sanctioned negotiability would not be established until the early 
sixteenth century.56 
As the history of the rente contracts fully reveal, rentes were indeed often 
redeemed, but, only at the option, the exclusive option, of the issuer and seller of 
rentes, i.e., the débirentiers. That usually, if not always, was a right that pertained to 
perpetual rents – i.e., to erfelijk renten or rentes héritables. Town and princely 
governments usually chose to redeem such rentes only when it was profitable to do 
so, particularly when  real interest rates declined, allowing them to refinance their 
rentes at lower costs. Obviously such choices injured the financial interests of the 
crédirentiers, who usually preferred to maintain the real value of their investments. 
Whether or not town and princely governments, as débirentiers, always had the 
completely independent right to redeem rentes without consulting the crédirentiers 
became an issue of considerable debate during the later Middle Ages.  
Finally, in 1416, the outstanding issues concerning the validity of rentes, and 
especially those concerning redemption, were brought before the Council of 
Constance (1414-18) for a final resolution. All those consulted, seven jurists and 
four theologians, confirmed the fully licit nature of rentes, as a non-usurious 
contract, and the exclusive right of the débirentier to redeem rentes at any time, but 
with one major provision: that such redemptions did not involve any reduction in 
(nominal, not real) capital values. All of these conclusions of the Council, and the 
earlier views of Innocent IV, were finally confirmed by three papal bulls, which 
finally removed any remaining doubts and any remaining taint of usury for the rente 
contracts: those of Martin V (Regimini, 1425), Nicholas V (Sollicitudo pastoralis, 1452), 
and finally, Calixtus III (Regimini, 1455).57 Nevertheless, for rente contracts to be 
fully licit and acceptable to the papacy, three further conditions had to be met: that 
                                                          
55 See B. SCHNAPPER, Les rentes au XVI siècle, cit., pp. 50-61. 
56 For the more complicated issue of the legal recognition of full negotiability, see J. MUNRO, 
Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution, cit., pp. 542-562, and other sources cited in n. 30 above; and 
IDEM, English “Backwardness” and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th to 16th 
Centuries, in International Trade in the Low Countries (14th-16th Centuries): Merchants, Organisation, Infrastructure, 
P. STABEL, B. BLONDÉ, A. GREVE eds., Leuven-Apeldoorn 2000 (Studies in Urban, Social, Economic, 
and Political History of the Medieval and Early Modern Low Countries, 10), pp. 105-167. 
57 B. SCHNAPPER, Les rentes chez les théologiens, cit., pp. 977-987; IDEM, Les rentes au XVI siècle, cit., 
pp. 65-59; J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, cit., pp. 160-161, 206-208, 230-237; H. VAN DER 
WEE, Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems, cit., pp. 304-305. The bull of Martin V (1425, confirmed by 
Calixtus III in 1455, in Extravagantes communes, 3.5.2 Regimini) had been restrictive in limiting the 
validity of rentes to those based on real estate (fixed, real properties). Thus the crucial bull was that of 
Nicholas V in 1452, which recognized the validity of rentes based merely on the assets or patrimony of 
the vender. That bull in turn had been influenced by the quodlibet that Willem II Bont of Leuven 
issued in 1451: as a refutation of Henry of Ghent‘s treatise, so that, in conclusion, the purchase of all 
such rents – de redditibus perpetuis et ad vitam est omni iure licita et nullo modo usuraria. See PH. GODDING, 
Wilhelmi Bont Lovaniensis de redditibus, cit., pp. 262-267. The maximum rates actually ranged from 1/10 
(10.0 percent) to 1/14 (7.14 percent). 
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the rentes had to be tied to real estate, or other real property - i.e., that payments 
related to such rentes must in essence be a form of rental income; that the annual 
return or annuity payments could not exceed ten percent of the capital sum (almost 
never observed); and, once more, that the débirentier alone had the exclusive right to 
redeem the census or rente contracts.58  
Rentes in the public finances of later-medieval Flemish towns: Douai, Bruges, and Ghent 
If a continuing public debate about the licit nature of rentes and the moral ‗taint 
of usury‘ were not fully and finally resolved until the promulgation of those three 
papal bulls in the early to mid-fifteenth century, we may better understand why the 
role of these financial instruments in public finance – urban and territorial – did not 
really become prominent until the fifteenth century in the finances of west 
European towns. There were, however, several other legal issues of lesser 
importance and also the very major issue of fully-fledged, legally-sanctioned 
negotiability that were also not fully resolved, as noted earlier, until the early 
sixteenth century: important issues that have been analysed in other publications.59 
But no one can really question the growing importance of rentes in both urban and 
territorial public finances from the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: 
throughout the Low Countries, south and north; France, for northern urban public 
finances, but also royal, national finances; in the Rhineland and other regions of 
western Germany; and in the Spanish union of Castile and Aragon (beginning in 
Catalonia, in the 1330s). The reasons for and nature of that diffusion – and why 
such forms of urban public finance were not, however, to be found in southern 
France and in Italy – have also been fully discussed in many other publications .60 
This current study must therefore be focused on the role of renten in the public 
finances and taxation in only the late-medieval Flemish towns (up to the mid 
sixteenth century), limitations imposed in part by the current status of the very 
laborious and very voluminous research that I have so far conducted. Thus, the 
historical analysis of this ‗financial revolution‘ requires us to return to the Flemish 
towns of the mid-thirteenth century, which were then part of the kingdom of 
France. 
 In Flanders, the francophone town of Douai (the leading textile producer, 
in the mid thirteenth century) was evidently the first to sell rentes. One financial 
document, dated about 1250, provides a substantial list of ‗les rentes que li ville doit 
                                                          
58 See in particular A.P. USHER, Early History of Deposit Banking, cit., p. 137, thereby denying any 
link between rentes and the usury question: H. VAN DER WEE, Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems, cit., 
pp. 303-304. In 1569, Pope St. Pius V issued the bull Cum onus, which revalidated the fifteenth-century 
bulls. J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, cit., p. 237; B. SCHNAPPER, Les rentes au XVI siècle, cit., 
pp. 117-120. 
59 See nn. 30 and 56, above. 
60 See nn. 3 and 6 above; and especially J. MUNRO, Medieval Origins, cit., pp. 505-562; J. TRACY, 
Financial Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands; IDEM, On the Dual Origins, pp. 13-24; see also J. ROUSTIT, 
La consolidation de la dette publique à Barcelone, cit., pp. 15-156; A. FURIO, La dette dans les dépenses 
municipales, in La fiscalité des villes au Moyen Age (Occident médiéval), D. MENJOT, M. SANCHEZ MARTINEZ 
eds, 3, La redistribution de l‟impot, Toulouse 2002, pp. 321-350. 
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a hiretage‘: i.e., rentes héritables, while another document, more accurately dated to 
March 1270, lists the town‘s current obligations for current life-rents: rentes viagères. 
Douai continued to sell issue rentes héritables, even after being incorporated directly 
into the French kingdom, in 1305, but the king (Philip IV) forbade the town to sell 
any more rentes viagères without royal permission. Those that were sold were 
marketed chiefly in Arras, Tournai, and Valenciennes, and were transferable to the 
spouses and offspring (sometimes grandchildren) of the buyers.61  
In the northern, Flemish-speaking zone, the leading industrial city of Ghent 
was certainly selling renten, from at least 1275: but evidently only lijfrenten, then 
amounting to £1,600 parisis. The Ghent town government also found most of its 
purchasers in Arras, whose financiers had agreed to convert Ghent‘s short term 
debts into these much longer-term rentes.62 Then, three years later, in July 1288, 
Ghent‘s town government began selling perpetual or erfelijk renten, after Count Guy 
de Dampierre (1278-1304) had issued an ordinance authorizing all the Flemish 
town governments to sell and to redeem such renten whenever they chose to do so, 
while also guaranteeing the principal values and annuity payments on these renten.63 
Meanwhile, the other leading Flemish town of Bruges had become heavily indebted 
to Arras bankers, in particular the renowned Crespin family, who collectively held 
almost half of Bruges‘s financial obligations: as of 1298, £157,093 parisis of a total 
of debt of £346,880 parisis, of which £124,307 were in ‗usurious loans‘ and 
£32,787 in lijfrenten or rentes viagères (20.9 percent).64 Issues of erfelijk renten or rentes 
héritables do not appear to have been of any great importance: just 3.14 percent of 
the value of lijfrenten, in 1297-98.65 
During this period, the leading Flemish towns were engaged in a serious 
conflict with their count, Guy de Dampierre, whose mother, Countess Marguerite 
                                                          
61 G. ESPINAS, Les finances de la commune de Douai, des origines au XVe siècle, Paris 1902, p. 314, n. 3; 
and p. 315-356. For perpetual rents, see pp. 314-21; for life-rents, see pp. 321-46. See also IDEM, La vie 
urbaine de Douai au moyen âge, Paris 1913. 
62 H. VAN WERVEKE, Gentsche stadsfinanciën, cit., pp. 289-290. 
63 Ordinance of 1 July 1288: ‗ke li eschevins puissent vendre a leur bourgois ki aisiet en second et 
a autre gent, rentes sur le vile devant dite, pour convertir les deniers en payements des debts de le vile 
ke ele doit à ore, leskeles rentes on puis racater kant le vile en iert aisie‘: in Mémoires sur les lois et coutumes 
et les privilèges des Gantois, depuis l‟institution de leur commune jusqu‟à la revolution de l‟an 1540, I-II, ed. CH.-L. 
DIERICX, Ghent 1817-18, cited in H. VAN WERVEKE, Gentsche stadsfinanciën, cit., pp. 289-290; see also 
pp. 164-171. The guarantees, however, probably did not extend beyond using his coerceive powers to 
ensure that the town governments made their annual payments. From October 1288 to 1290, a total 
of 118 erfrenten brieven, with a yearly average of £2,046 parisis, with an annuity rate of 10 percent (£1 
parisis for each £10 par.) 
64 See A. DERVILLE, La finance Arrageoise: usure et banque, in Arras au moyen âge: histoire et littérature, 
M.-M. CASTELLANI, J.-P. MARTIN eds., Arras 1994, pp. 40-41: based upon the municipal accounts in 
De rekeningen van de stad Brugge, 1280-1319, C. WYFFELS, J. DE SMET eds., I-II, Ghent 1965-1971, I, 
1280-1302 (evidently based on doc. no. 10, for 14 Sept 1297 - 23 Dec. 1298, pp. 509-675). The total 
financial obligations were 13.62 times as much as Bruges‘s revenues that year: £25,460.75 parisis; 
though my calculations of the data differ from those of Derville. 
65 In the account for Sept 1297 to Dec 1298, the total payments made to holders of rentes viagères 
or lijfrenten (redditus ad vitam) amounted to £3,154 5s 11 d parisis (225 persons, including Robert and 
Baldwin Crespin and Jehan Boinebroke); but payments for rentes héritables (redditu hereditario or rente 
yretaule) were only £99 (4 persons). Rekeningen van de stad Brugge, cit., I, p. 551. 
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de Constantinople (r.1244-78, d. 1280) had provoked the conflict, in 1275, by 
deposing Ghent‘s oligarchic civic government, the so-called XXXIX. In response, 
the Flemish town governments then secured support from the French king, whose 
Parlement de Paris restored the Ghent government, though imposing external 
financial audits. In 1289, Philip IV (1285-1314) placed Ghent under his personal 
protection, while also installing the Bailiff of Vermandois as the governor of 
Flanders. Two years later, in November 1291, Ghent‘s town government had 
secured from the Parlement de Paris a judicial decision that permitted all the 
Flemish towns to suspend further payments to all those holding rentes à vie who had 
already received more than their original investment, ‗jusques à tant que la 
commune sera délivrée des debtes‘.66 Possibly connected to this decree was Ghent‘s 
decision to suspend all further issue of rentes. 
The subsequent events may explain why Ghent did not, in fact, resume the sale 
of rentes for another four decades. In 1296-97, Count Guy de Dampierre rashly 
sought to remove the French royal presence from Flanders: he again abolished the 
Ghent XXXIX oligarchy, and then formed an alliance with Philip IV‘s chief enemy, 
Edward I (1272-1307) of England, which country was also a major source of the 
wools so necessary for Flanders‘ textile-based economy. In retaliation, Philip IV 
invaded Flanders, in June 1297, defeating the Flemish forces at the Battle of 
Furnes, and then occupying half the county. In 1299-1300, a French royal army 
again invaded, and occupied the remainder of the county, while also imprisoning 
Count Guy. In 1302, when oppressive rule from the French occupiers had 
provoked a major rebellion, the urban guild militias, aided by the count‘s forces, 
won an astonishing victory over the French cavalry at the Battle of Kortrijk. For 
many Belgian historians that marked the first step towards Flemish independence – 
though certainly not immediately. In 1305, Philip IV‘s armies finally forced the 
Flemings to accept defeat, by the Truce of Athis-sur-Orge, which subjected 
Flanders to enormous indemnities, and to the loss of the major francophone towns 
of Lille, Douai, and Orchies. Further Franco-Flemish conflicts then ensued, so that 
peace was not achieved until 1319-20.67 There is no evidence that, during this 
protracted era of conflicts, any of the Flemish towns resorted to the use of renten to 
finance their wars or to pay these heavy indemnities.  
Thus, after more than four decades, and not until the mid 1320s – in 1325-26, 
to be more exact – the city government of Ghent finally resumed its sale of renten, 
which now consisted almost exclusively of erfelijk renten. It also resumed its annual 
annuity payments on those suspended renten from the 1290s.68 At this time, Ghent 
                                                          
66 See G. BIGWOOD, Le régime juridique, cit., II, doc. no. 17, pp. 299-300; B. SCHNAPPER, Les rentes 
chez les théologiens et les canonistes du XIIIe au XVIe siècles, in Études d‟histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabriel 
le Bras, ed. G. VEDEL, I-II, Paris 1965 (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), I, pp. 965-995, 
especially p. 972. 
67 D. NICHOLAS, Medieval Flanders, cit., pp. 186-202, 212-224; IDEM, Town and Countryside: Social, 
Economic, and Political Tensions in Fourteenth-Century Flanders, Bruges 1971; IDEM, Metamorphosis of a 
Medieval City, cit., pp. 1-16; H. NOWE, La bataille des éperons d‟or, Brussels 1945, pp. 13-113. 
68 Gentsche stads- en baljuwsrekeningen, 1280-1336/ Comptes de la ville de Gand, 1280-1336, J. 
VUYLSTEKE ed., in the series Oorkondenboek der stad Gent, eerste afdeeling: Rekeningen [Cartulaire 
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was also in the midst of yet another civil war, the so-called Revolt of Maritime 
Flanders (1323-28), in which Ghent wisely refused to participate, thereby gaining 
considerable economic ascendancy in Flanders.69 We may well wonder what had 
happened to the holders of Ghent‘s civic renten in the intervening three decades. If 
the city, as the seller of the renten and thus as legal débirentier had pledged its assets 
(properties and tax incomes) to honour its commitment to make the annual 
payments, had any rentier sued the town government for non-payment? There is no 
evidence that any such law suits had been launched.70 But obviously the Ghent 
town government well knew that, unless it honoured its commitments to pay the 
arrears on previously issued renten, it would have little success in selling any new 
issues. 
In virtually every succeeding year of the fourteenth century, Ghent continued 
to sell small but respectable amounts of such renten.  The most remarkable financial 
event to be observed in the Ghent town accounts took place in the fiscal year 1346-
47, towards the end of the revolutionary ‗Artevelde era‘ (1335-1349), when Ghent, 
governed by a weaver-led guild regime, dominated Flanders, to the exclusion of the 
count (Louis de Nevers, 1322-46); and in doing so, it was antagonizing the other 
leading Flemish towns.71 In that year, which was also just on the eve of the Black 
Death, the Ghent civic government marketed a remarkably large amount of 
lijfrenten: in total worth £21,295 parisis (£1,774.583 groot Flemish), almost thirty times 
the value of the erfelijk renten sold that year.72 These political circumstances may 
explain the other remarkable feature of this financial experiment: that virtually all of 
these renten were sold outside the county of Flanders, in the neighbouring duchy of 
Brabant, especially in the major drapery towns of Brussels and Leuven.73 In view of 
the fact that lijfrenten, if indeed for one life only, were extinguished on the death of 
the holders, one may well speculate on how much the Ghent civic government 
enjoyed a reduction in its public debt from the ensuing and highly fortuitous Black 
Death of 1348. 
Subsequently, in the fourteenth century, Ghent marketed just two further issues 
of lijfrenten, in far more modest amounts: £2,311 parisis (= £193.583 groot) in 1349-
50, shortly after the overthrow of the weaver-dominated regime; and even less, just 
                                                          
de la ville de Gand, première série: Comptes], Gent 1900; and H. VAN WERVEKE, Gentsche 
stadsfinanciën, cit., pp. 235-236; 353-353. 
69 The war ended when French armies defeated the rebel forces of Bruges and Ypres (at Cassel, 
August 1328). See D. NICHOLAS, Medieval Flanders, cit., pp. 209-217. 
70 For legal actions undertaken against some sixteenth-century defaulting Dutch towns, see J. 
TRACY, Financial Revolution, cit., pp. 28-107. 
71 For the political events, see D. NICHOLAS, The Van Arteveldes of Ghent: the Varieties of Vendetta 
and the Hero in History, Ithaca 1988, pp. 19-98; IDEM, Medieval Flanders, cit., pp. 219-224; and H. VAN 
WERVEKE, Jacques Van Artevelde, Brussels 1943, pp. 37-110. Jacob Artevelde himself had been 
assassinated in July 1345. 
72 The transactions involving the sale of renten are contained in the annual civic treasurer‘s 
accounts, in the Stadsarchief Gent, stadsrekeningen, Series 400. See the list of sources for Tables IA and 
IB in J. MUNRO, Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution, cit., pp. 530-32. Note that £12 parisis = £1 
groot Flemish. 
73 From: N. DE PAUW AND J VUYLSTEKE, De rekeningen der stad Gent: Tijdvak van Jacob Van 
Artevelde,  III, pp. 21- 22. Payments made on these lijfrenten in 1347-48: pp. 190-196. 
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£1,232 parisis (£102.667 groot) in 1355-56. Some of these had been sold in Mons 
(Bergen), in the nearby francophone but Imperial county of Hainaut. There is, 
however, no conclusive evidence that during the fourteenth century Ghent or other 
Flemish towns were unduly dependent on external sources in financing civic debts.74  
In sum, in only two periods of the fourteenth century were revenues from 
public borrowing significant in Ghent. The first was the previously noted 
resumption of renten sales in the mid-1320s, in the latter phase of the Revolt of 
Maritime Flanders (1323-28), when revenues from public borrowing accounted for 
11.46 percent of Ghent‘s total income; but only 4.06 percent was in the form of 
renten, and the rest came from loans. The second was the aforementioned Artevelde 
era, with such disruptive civil wars, from 1336 to 1350. In 1336-40, 43.83 percent 
of total civic income came from public borrowing, but now only 2.19 percent came 
from renten sales. Conversely, in 1346-50, 27.56 percent of total civic income came 
from public borrowing, of which, this time renten sales accounted for 16.14 percent. 
In the later fourteenth century, from 1361 to 1390, when the only form of annuities 
that the city sold were erfelijk renten, they accounted for an average of only 3.0 
percent of total civic revenues during these three decades (followed by a long gap in 
the accounts, to 1400).75 
In these same decades, however, when Ghent usually experienced annual 
deficits, payments on the civic public debt accounted for an average of 20.70 
percent of total expenditures.76 Over the fourteenth century as a whole (or, rather 
from 1320 to 1390, when civic accounts are available), the percentages of total 
expenditures in the form of debt payments ranged from an initial high, for the first 
half of the fourteenth century, of 37.20 percent in 1321-25; and in the second half 
of the century, the maximum shares of total civic expenditures in debt payments 
were 41.28 percent in 1361-65, and 44.31 percent in 1366-70. The lowest shares of 
total expenditures in debt payments were just 2.21 percent in 1351-55, and then 
shares of about 4.5 percent of total expenditures in each of the quinquenniums 
from 1376-80 to 1386-90 . Clearly the role of renten in Ghent‘s fourteenth-century 
civic finances had not yet assumed the major role that it would in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.77  
                                                          
74 Ibid., pp. 397-445; H. VAN WERVEKE, Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (1351-1364), cit., pp. 226-
242; 369-341 (account for 1358-59). See also: See also H. VAN WERVEKE, Gentsche stadsfinanciën, cit., 
pp. 282-290; FRYDE, Public Credit, cit., pp. 430-543; J. TRACY, Financial Revolution, cit., pp. 13-15. 
75  See J. MUNRO, Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution, cit., Tables IA and IB, pp. 530-32. 
76 See Ibid, pp. 530-32. See also J. TRACY, Financial Revolution, cit., p. 14, who states that ‗between 
1346 and 1356;‘ but clearly the annual issues extended long beyond that year, certainly up to the next 
Ghent (Artevelde) revolt of 1379 and beyond. My statistical analyses of the public finances from the 
town accounts of Ghent (from 1400-1550), Bruges (1302-1550), Ypres (1408-1550), and Kortrijk 
(1393-1550) will be presented in future publications. 
77 See n. 75 above. For currently available publications on fifteenth-century Ghent (though only 
to the 1450s), see especially M. BOONE, Geld en macht: de Gentse stadsfinanciën en de Bourgondische 
staatsvorming (1384-1453), Ghent 1990 (Verhandelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en 
Oudheidkunde te Gent, XV), pp. 60-67, 163, and Table 11 (sales of lijf- and erfrenten, but only for the 
years 1453-1461), available only in a microfiche. This book regrettably pays almost no attention to this 
form of civic finances. But see also IDEM, Plus deuil que joie: Les ventes de rentes par la ville de Gand pendant 
la période bourguignonne: entre intérêts privés et finances publiques, in ―Credit Communal: bulletin trimestriel‖, 
JOHN MUNRO 994 
Financing rentes with excise taxes on food consumption, drink, and other household necessities 
in late-medieval Flemish towns 
The most important issue to be examined now is the question: precisely how 
did the Flemish (and other) urban governments finance the annual annuity 
payments – obviously the term ‗interest payments‘ is quite inappropriate – and also 
any redemptions of renten? As indicated earlier, the papal acceptances of renten as 
fully licit, non-usurious contracts depended in part on their link with income from 
real property. As an examination of the Flemish town accounts for the late-
medieval and early-modern eras reveals, and as independent analyses of Bruno 
Kuske and James Tracy confirm, the annual payments (and redemptions) came 
from two different sources, each linked to the specific corresponding type of the 
two major kinds of rentes.78 The payments for the perpetual rents – the rentes 
héritables or erfelijk renten – were usually derived from the rental incomes from actual 
real estate or some other form of immobile property, and thus in accordance with 
the three fifteenth-century papal bulls.  
For the rentes viagères (à vie) or lijfrenten, payments normally came from the 
accijnzen or excise taxes that the town levied on the inhabitants‘ consumption of 
various foodstuffs (alcoholic beverages, grain, flour, bread itself, meat and dairy 
products, herring, and other species of fish), textile products (wool, cloth, linen), 
and building products (wood, iron, coal and other fuels). Note that, in accordance 
with the principles established by the fifteenth-century papal bulls on rentes, all of 
these commodities were products of the land (and the sea): certainly they were all 
the fruits of ‗real property‘ (real estate). The obvious significance of this form of 
public-finance related taxation was that it was essentially very regressive, in 
representing a far greater burden on the poor than on the middle classes, let alone 
the rich. Most governments today do not tax the consumption of vital necessities, 
especially foodstuffs for home preparation: as opposed to packaged ‗junk foods‘, 
and food and drink purchased and consumed within restaurants and bars.  
More generally, most if not all towns (and later, many territorial or national 
governments) collected such tax incomes not from the specific excise taxes levied 
on individual urban consumers, but rather from the annual or even monthly sale of 
the pachten or tax farms. Tax-farming was the major feature and indeed major curse 
of public finances in medieval and early-modern Europe. Most governments were 
almost always in urgent need of ready cash, and could ill afford to wait until tax 
receipts slowly percolated from the citizenry into the civic or territorial treasury. 
Indeed, as the theologian Giles of Lessines had observed (in 1278): ‗future things 
over a period are not estimated of such value as things collected in an instant [in 
                                                          
176, 1991-92, pp. 3-24. Somewhat surprisingly there are no studies on Ghent itself in Urban Public 
Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th-18th Centuries), M. BOONE, K. 
DAVIDS, P. JANSSENS eds., Turnhout 2003 (Brepols, Studies in European Urban History, III); but for 
Flanders and Holland in this volume see nn. 94-100, below. 
78 B. KUSKE, Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städte, cit., pp. 27-45; J. TRACY, On the Dual Origins, cit., pp. 
14-17. 
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the present]‘.79  Usually, these tax farms were sold at auction, to the highest bidder; 
and we must therefore assume that the sales values underestimate the actual tax 
burden on the urban citizenry, since the tax farmers obviously hoped to make a 
profit, over and beyond the amounts that they paid to the city. On the other hand, 
if the bids were truly competitive, such auctions would have reduced the extent of 
‗economic rent‘ that the tax farmers could have extracted from urban consumers. 
 The two most important commodities, by far, on which these excise-taxes 
were levied were beer and (secondly) wine. Of course, they also represent the 
principal exception to the just-enunciated dictum that most modern governments 
do not tax the consumption of foodstuffs. On the contrary, virtually all 
governments, past and present, have levied very heavy taxes on alcoholic beverages; 
and the modern justification is that they are ‗sin taxes‘, taxes on ‗morally dubious‘ 
luxuries that anyone can now choose to avoid. But of course, from the point of 
view of any government, past or present, the highly addictive nature of alcohol has 
meant that most consumers (or those lacking will power) cannot avoid the 
consumption of such beverages, for which, therefore, demand is very highly 
inelastic and thus virtually guaranteed to produce high tax revenues. 
Apart from the arguably irrelevant moral considerations about ‗sin taxes‘ 
involved in late-medieval public finances, one may well contend that beer and wine, 
especially beer in northern Europe, were in fact vital necessities, because most 
other beverages, water and milk, especially, were so generally unsafe to drink. Most 
sources of water for urban public consumption came from highly polluted rivers, 
streams, and lakes. Indeed, the single most important cause of the remarkable drop 
in European and North American mortalities in the later nineteenth-century was 
the introduction of urban systems of water-purification and related sanitation 
systems.80 Those innovations in turn were the product of the almost identical 
discovery of the bacterial transmission of diseases in the mid-1870s: first, in 1876, 
from the researches of the German micro-biologist Robert Koch (1843-1910); and 
then, in 1878, from those of the French biologist Louis Pasteur (1822-1895).81 
                                                          
79 See F. VERAJA, Origini della controversia, cit., pp. 89-99; J.T. NOONAN, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, 
cit., pp. 155-157; O. LANGHOLM, Economics of Medieval Schools, cit., pp. 310-317: ‗.. a present and 
assembled thing is estimated at a higher value than a future and divided one‘ (i.e., in terms of future 
annuity payments). On the demand side, that observation explains the reality of interest; on the supply 
side, it is the opportunity cost of foregone alternative investments. 
80 See L.P. CAIN, E.J. ROTELLA, Death and Spending: Urban Mortality and Municipal Expenditure on 
Sanitation, in ―Annales de démographie historique‖, 101, 2001, 1, pp. 139-154; and also M. HAINES, 
The Urban Mortality Transition in the United States, 1800-1940, in ―Annales de démographie historique‖, 
101, 2001, 1, pp. 33-64. Possibly the introduction into western Europe, of first coffee, reputedly by 
the Ottoman Turkish siege of Vienna in 1529 (certainly by 1600), and then of tea, by the Dutch, in 
1655 (from Ceylon), provided an effective alternative, in that both required boiling water, which 
action would kill the harmful bacteria. 
81 In 1876, Robert Koch had demonstrated that the bacterium Bacillus anthracis causes anthrax, a 
disease of animals also transmissible to humans. He subsequently discovered the two bacteria that 
cause tuberculosis and cholera. In 1905, he won the Nobel prize in medicine. Pasteur‘s 1878 paper on 
micro-organisms in various beverages led to the ‗pasteurization‘ process of heating milk to kill harmful 
bacteria in milk. 
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The importance of beer especially in late-medieval consumer expenditures can 
be demonstrated from various household and institutional budgets, which are also 
important for this study, in that they are major components of the cost-of-living or 
Consumer Price Indexes [CPI] that will be used to measure the burden of these 
excise taxes. For fifteenth-century England, the best known budget is the set of 
household accounts of William Savernak, in Bridport, Dorsetshire for the years 
1453-1460, which allocated a share of 23 percent to beer (with barley malt), 
compared to 20 percent for cereal grains and 37 percent for meat, dairy products, 
and fish combined.82 In the well-known Phelps Brown and Hopkins ‗Basket of 
Consumables‘ Price Index [CPI], the share allocated to beer is almost identical: 22.5 
percent.83 Subsequently, Steve Rappaport allocated a 20-percent share for beer and 
ale, in his consumer price index for early-modern London.84 For the southern Low 
Countries (the Antwerp-Lier region in Brabant), Herman Van der Wee chose a 
slightly lower share for beer: 17.1 percent, even though in principle he sought to 
adopt the same weights employed in the Phelps Brown and Hopkins price index.85 
His choice was influenced by the accounts for Lier‘s Beguinage Infirmary (1586-
1600), which indicate that, on average, beer accounted for 16 percent of total 
foodstuffs expenditures (while wine accounted for only 1 percent).86 Van der Wee 
also observed that the annual per capita beer consumption in Lier (near Antwerp) 
was about 310 litres in 1472 – well more than double the Belgian per capita 
consumption in 1958 (115 litres).87 According to statistical analyses of Richard 
                                                          
82 See K.L. WOOD-LEGH, A Small Household of the Fifteenth Century, Manchester 1956. 
83 E.H. PHELPS BROWN, SH. V. HOPKINS, Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables, Compared with 
Builders‟ Wage Rates, in ―Economica”, 23, 1956, 92, pp. 296-314: reprinted in Essays in Economic History, 
ed. E.M. CARUS-WILSON, I-III, London 1954-62, II, pp. 168-178, 179-196, and in E.H. PHELPS 
BROWN, SH. V. HOPKINS, A Perspective of Wages and Prices, London 1981, pp. 13-39 (with indexes not in 
the original). They allocated, in addition to the 22.5% for drink, 20.0% for cereal grains, 12.5% for 
dairy products (butter and cheese), 21.0% for meat (mutton and pork), totalling 80.0% for foodstuffs. 
The remaining 20% consisted of 7.5% for fuels and 12.5% for textiles. 
84 S. RAPPAPORT, Worlds Within Worlds : The Structures of Life in Sixteenth-century London, Cambridge-
New York 1989, p. 125 (Table 5.1). 
85 H. VAN DER WEE, Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen: Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen 
Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400-1700, in Album aangeboden aan Charles Verlinden ter gelegenheid 
van zijn dertig jaar professoraat, Wetteren 1975, pp. 413-447; reissued in English translation (without the 
tables) as Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern 
Netherlands, 1400-1700, in ―Acta Historiae Neerlandicae‖, 10, 1978, pp. 58-78; republished in IDEM, 
The Low Countries in the Early Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman, Cambridge-New York 1993 
(Cambridge University Press and Variorum), pp. 223-241. 
86 See IDEM, Voeding en Dieet in het Ancien Régime, in ―Spiegel Historiael”, 1, 1966, pp. 94-101, 
republished in translation: as Nutrition and Diet in the Ancien Régime, in IDEM, The Low Countries, cit., pp. 
279-287. In these Lier Beguignage expenditure accounts, the allocation of food consumption shares 
were: 44% for bread, 16% for beer, 1% only for wine, 20% for meat, 3% for fish, and 10% for dairy 
products. But note, however, that fuels and textiles are not included. See also IDEM, The Growth of the 
Antwerp Market and the European Economy (Fourteenth-sixteenth Centuries), I-III, The Hague 1963 (Martinus 
Nijhoff), I, Statistics, Appendix 47: Budget of the Infirmary of the Béguignage of Lier for Foodstuffs, 
1526-1602), pp. 534-538. 
87 H. VAN DER WEE, Nutrition and Diet, cit., pp. 282-284, and Figure 151.; and p. 286 (on water 
consumption). See also E. AERTS, Het bier van Lier: de economische ontwikkeling van de bierindustrie in een 
middelgroote Brabantse stad, einde 14de - begin 19de eeuw, Brussels 1996. 
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Unger, the mean annual per capita beer consumption in various towns of the 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Low Countries was as follows: in Antwerp, 319 
litres; Bruges, 263 litres; Leuven, 257 litres; Leiden, 255 litres; Haarlem, 236 litres; 
and Ghent, 202 litres. Unger further notes that beer was not just a beverage but an 
important and highly nutritious component in household cuisine.88 Finally, and 
most recently, Robert Allen‘s independently constructed price-index base for early-
modern northern Europe (1500 - 1900) also allocates a 20.6 percent share to beer 
and ale, in his household budget, representing an estimated average annual per 
capita consumption of 182 litres.89  
Clearly the burden of excise taxes on beer consumption was a very heavy one 
for the average lower-class or working-class household in the late-medieval Low 
Countries (and for northern Europe in general).90 The burden of consumption 
taxes on wine, however, may have been correspondingly and relatively lighter for 
the working and artisanal classes, if we may assume that they drank principally beer, 
and little wine. As just noted, the Lier Beguignage expenditures on food and drink 
indicate that wine accounted for only 1.0 percent of total expenditures. As Figures 
5 and 6 below indicate, for Aalst‘s urban excise tax-farm revenues, the beer excise-
tax farm normally accounted for four to five times the revenue acquired from the 
wine excise-farm for the 150-year period from 1396-1400 to 1546-50. Over this 
entire period, wine accounted for a mean of 11.93 percent of total excise-tax farm 
                                                          
88 R. UNGER, A History of Brewing in Holland, 900 - 1900: Economy, Technology, and the State, Leiden 
2001, Table III-4, pp. 90-91, noting also that the daily beer ration for English and Hanseatic sailors 
was then about 5 litres. For Leuven, see also R. VAN UYTVEN, Stadsfinanciën en stadsekonomie te Leuven 
van de XIIde tot het einde der XVIde eeuw, Brussels 1961, pp. 313-336, especially p. 335; and IDEM, Beer 
Consumption and the Socio-Economic Situation in the Franc of Bruges in the Sixteenth Century, English 
translation of Het bierverbruik en de sociaal-economische toestand in het Brugse Vrije in de zestiende eeuw, in 
―Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis, gesticht onder de benaming ‗Sociéte 
d‘emulation‘ te Brugge‖, 131, 1994, pp. 5-34; republished in IDEM, Production and Consumption in the Low 
Countries, 13th-16th Centuries, Aldershot 2001 (Variorum Collected Studies Series CS 714, Ashgate-
Variorum), XII, pp. 1-24;  E. AERTS, Het bier van Lier, cit. Furthermore, according to T.R. Gourvish 
and Richard Wilson, ‗beer was the largest item of working-class expenditure, ranking well above 
amounts spent on meat or bread‘, around 1870. Furthermore, citing evidence of Victorian observers, 
they estimate that ‗between 14 and 25 percent of working-class incomes was spent on beer‘, with a 
mean per capita beer consumption, in England and Wales, during the years 1875-79, of about £4.36 in 
expenditures, and 40.5 gallons (184.12 litres) in physical consumption, which, however, fell to 29.4 
gallons (133.66 litres) per person annually, in 1910-13. See T.R. GOURVISH, R.G. WILSON, The British 
Brewing Industry, 1830–1980, Cambridge-New York 1994, tables 2.1, p. 30, table 2.5, p. 34, and data and 
quotation on p. 36. 
89 R. ALLEN, The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World 
War, in ―Explorations in Economic History”, 38, 2001, 4, pp. 411-447, Table 3, p. 421. For southern 
Europe, the equivalent average annual per capita alcoholic consumption was 68.25 litres of wine. 
90 It is interesting to note, as well, that in late-eighteenth century England, beer (sum of beer, 
malt, and hops) accounted for 24.6% of the ‗Major Taxes‘ (about 90% of the presumed total) 
collected, while wine accounted for only 4.63%. The sum of all taxes on alcohol and tobacco then 
accounted from 43.30% of all such English tax revenues (£6,917,000 out of £15,973,000). P. 
O‘BRIEN, Political Economy of British Taxation, cit., Table 5, p. 11. See also the following note, on beer 
and wine taxes. 
JOHN MUNRO 998 
revenues, beer for 43.17 percent – and the total of the excise tax farms for the two 
beverages account for 55.11 percent of the total.91 
Since we may further assume that most of those who purchased rentes from 
urban or territorial governments, came principally, if by no means entirely, from the 
wealthier strata of late-medieval and early-modern European societies, this highly 
regressive form of taxation to finance the payments on these various rentes 
presumably also meant a substantial transfer of income from the urban poor to the 
wealthy (who were not all necessarily urban). Even today, or certainly in the 
previous three centuries, the common term rentier – obviously directly derived from 
the very word rente – refers to those who live from investment income (rather than 
from ‗earned income‘, such as wages or business profits), and often principally 
from their holdings of government debts. The most common implication of this 
term, so often used with a negative connotation, is that such people come from the 
ultra-richer strata of society. Who would doubt, for example, that the Arras banking 
family of the Crespins, who held such a very large share of Bruges‘ public debt in 
the 1290s – in ‗usurious‘ loans and renten – were not among the very richest to be 
found in north-western France (and Flanders) in this era? 
While that assumption may well be generally valid for the late-medieval era, it 
was not necessarily true of all towns. For example, in the small town of Aalst 
(Alost), in eastern (Imperial) Flanders, the annual town accounts (stadsrekeningen) 
indicate that the urban market for lijfrenten was remarkably broad, especially for 
such a small and economically lesser town, whose early fifteenth-century 
population has been estimated at 3,600 to 4,000 (today‘s population: 76,800).92 One 
random sample, taken from the account for February 1402-February 1403, lists 
annuity payments to 769 recipients. If they were all citizens of Aalst – and the 
accounts do not designate their residences – that number would represent almost 
20 percent of the town‘s estimated total population, and perhaps 40 percent of the 
                                                          
91  See Figure 5. In the Bruges annual town accounts, for the years 1308-1500 [STADSARCHIEF 
BRUGGE: Stadsrekeningen 1307/08 to 1499/1500], there is a very marked shift from a predominance of 
wine excise tax-farm revenues in the early fourteenth century to a predominance of beer excise-tax 
farms in the late fifteenth century – sometimes as much as 81% for beer and thus just 19% for wine, 
for the combined total of the farms on the two beverages. Over this entire period, the mean 
percentages for excise-tax farm revenues from beer is 52.38%, and from wine, 47.62%. I have not yet 
calculated the total annual tax farm revenues for this entire, almost two-century long, period. 
92 For the economy, demography, and society of Aalst and neighbouring Oudenaarde, the 
fundamental study is: E. THOEN, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen gedurende de late 
Middeleeuwen en het begin van de Moderne Tijden. Testregio: de kasselrijen van Oudenaarde en Aalst (einde 13de – 
eerste helft 16de eeuw), I-II, Ghent 1988 (Belgisch Centrum voor Landelijke Geschiedenis, 90), Part I: ‗De 
demografische evolutie‘, pp. 15-233 (but more on Oudenaarde). For the population figures, see also P. 
STABEL, De kleine stad in Vlaanderen: Bevolkingsdynamiek en economische functies van de kleine en secundaire 
stedelijke centra in het Gentse kwartier (14de-16de eeuw), Brussels 1995 (Paleis der Academiën, 
Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van 
België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 57, 156), p. n. 18, stating that Aalst had about 3,600 inhabitants 
in 1338 and possibly 4,000 in 1500; but see also IDEM, Dwarfs among Giants: The Flemish Urban Network 
in the Late Middle Ages, Leuven-Apeldoorn 1997 (Garant, Studies in Urban, Social, Economic and 
Political History of the Medieval and Modern Low Countries, 8), p. 41, indicating that Aalst‘s 
fifteenth-century population was ‗3,600 or more‘, which ‗grew further in the middle of the 16th 
century‘. See nn. 142 and 144, below. 
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adult population. If so, by no means all of them could have been ‗rich‘.93 But, as has 
just been shown for fourteenth-century Ghent, and has also been demonstrated for 
other late-medieval towns in the Low Countries, many purchasers of urban renten 
were non-residents, some from very distant towns. Some others were resident 
foreign merchants, though obviously more so in towns such as Ghent and Bruges, 
rather than in small towns such as Aalst.94 For Bruges‘ annuity markets, Laurence 
Derycke, in a meticulous study on late fifteenth-century Bruges, found that citizens 
were then generally not in the majority of renten holders, not until the early sixteenth 
century.95 The breadth of the market for annuities varied, of course, by town, 
region, and period, and may have become broader by the eighteenth century, 
especially in the northern Netherlands.96  
But, as Laurence Derycke has also demonstrated, the domestic ‗annuity 
purchasers belonged to the same socio-economic strata as those from which the 
members of the urban government were recruited‘ in  Bruges. To be sure that 
included ‗craftsmen‘, but principally the very wealthy craftsmen-entrepreneurs who 
were the guild leaders represented in the town government, which (since 1302) had 
allotted 16 of the 24 magistracies (seats) to the craft guilds.97 As she also notes, 
those who were socially and economically considered to be poorters – merchants and 
wealthy property owners – were often technically also guild leaders. She contends 
that by the early fifteenth century, the Bruges civic government was ‗almost 
exclusively in the hands of the city‘s commercial and industrial elite,‘ which she calls 
an ‗alliance of the poorterij on the one hand and the rich and powerful craft guilds on 
the other‘, who held ‗an iron grip on the public finances‘. For the ‗richer craft-
guilds and the poorterij were time and again the socio-economic circles par 
excellence where enough money was available to buy public renten, as urban 
annuities were expensive and not attainable for everyone‘. She contends, in 
particular, that ‗the cheapest annuity that was sold on the occasion of the three 
issues [1472, 1489, 1492] studied cost 9 lb. gr, an amount that corresponded .. to 
the wage of a skilled mason for nine full months of labour‘. Therefore, ‗the lower 
layers of the population were fully excluded from participation in the consolidated 
public debt.‘ According to her analyses, only 20 percent of the buyers were 
                                                          
93 Aalst Stadsrekeningen (1395-1550) in ALGMEEN RIJKSARCHIEF BRUSSEL, Rekenkamer, doc. nos. 
31,412 - 31,553. The account no. for this year 1402-03 is: 31,487. 
94 In the fifteenth-century Bruges accounts, the renten rolls indicate a very large number of foreign 
buyers: from almost all of the major towns in the Low Countries, the Hanseatic towns, and mercantile 
towns of Portugal and Italy. See L. DERYCKE, The Public Annuity Market in Bruges at the End of the 15th 
Century, in Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th-18th 
Centuries), M. BOONE, K. DAVIDS, P. JANSSENS eds., Turnout 2003 (Studies in European Urban History 
(1100-1800), 3), pp. 165-182. 
95 Ibid., p. 167: the marked reduction in the number of foreign buyers was partly the goal of 
urban government policies. 
96 See the studies in M. BOONE, K. DAVIDS, P. JANSSENS, Urban Public Debts, cited in nn. 77, 94-
95, 97-100; and see also M. BOONE, ‗Plus deuil que joie‘, pp. 3-24, in n. 77 above. 
97 Especially in textiles, building trades, leather- and luxury-wares; butchers and brewers, etc. See 
M. RYCKAERT, A. VANDEWALLE, Brugge: de geschiedenis van een Europese stad, Tielt 1999, pp. 41-42, cited 
in L. DERYCKE, Public Annuity Market, pp. 171-72; and also M. RYCKAERT, Bruges: L'histoire d'une ville 
européenne, Lannoo 1999. 
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responsible for 75 percent of the total revenues produced from annuity sales; and 
that the major purchasers were ‗the major office holders in the government, 
treasurers, and noblemen and those linked by marriage to noble families,‘ including 
many of their widows.98  
Similar circumstances may be found in some sixteenth-century Dutch towns. In 
Dordrecht, over the century 1550-1650, 23 percent of those purchasing urban renten 
came from outside the city, according to Manon van der Heijden, whose research, 
for the much shorter period of 1549-1577, also indicates that 34 percent of the 
urban magistrates bought annuities.99 For Amsterdam, in the years, 1578-1608, 
Martijn van der Burg and Marjolein t‘Hart found that merchants accounted for 63 
percent of purchases of urban debts and annuities; industrial entrepreneurs, for 21 
percent; professionals (doctors, chemists, notaries), for 7 percent; office-holders, 
for 5 percent. But if, to that last group are added those from the other categories 
known to have held government offices, this category of urban magistrates would 
account for about 22 percent of the total annuities market.100 Similarly, James Tracy 
had earlier demonstrated the overwhelming prominence of urban office-holders 
and their surviving widows as purchasers of renten in eight sixteenth-century Dutch 
towns: especially those whose occupations were ‗grain dealers, Baltic exporters, 
merchants, and shippers‘ (along with some drapers, brewers, and professionals).101 
From all these studies, therefore, we may safely assert that, even if not all buyers of 
urban renten in the late-medieval and early-modern Low Countries were ‗rich‘, the 
preponderant majority of them most certainly were, and further that they also held 
an even greater share of the aggregate urban public debt.102 
Later-medieval and sixteenth-century Flanders: the role of renten Aalst‟s civic finances 
The Flemish town that constitutes the major object of this study on late-
medieval urban finances, renten, and excise taxes is the aforementioned Aalst, from 
the very late fourteenth to the mid sixteenth century. A small town near the border 
with the duchy of Brabant, to the east, Aalst had a far different financial history 
                                                          
98 L. DERYCKE, Public Annuity Market, pp. 171-177. 
99 M. VAN DER HEIJDEN, Renteniers and the Public Debt of Dordrecht (1555-1572), in Urban Public 
Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th - 18th Centuries), M. BOONE, K. 
DAVIDS, P. JANSSENS eds., cit., pp. 183-196. 
100 M. VAN DER BURG, M. ‗t HART, Renteniers and the Recovery of Amsterdam‟s Credit (1578-1605), in 
Urban Public Debts, cit., pp. 197-216: with the remaining 4 percent classed as ‗others‘. See also VAN DER 
HEIJDEN, Public Debt, cit., pp. 190-94: stating that in Dordrecht ‗urban officeholders and their kin were 
thus highly involved in urban finances‘, and that in the century 1550-1650, an average of 58 percent of 
female buyers of renten were ‗related to the political elite‘; and that 69 percent of the women were 
widows. For other studies on Dutch towns in this volume, see W. FRITSCHY, Three Centuries of Urban 
and Provincial Public Debts: Amsterdam and Holland, pp. 75-92; and R. VAN SHAÏK, The Sale of Annuities and 
Financial Politics in a Town in the Eastern Netherlands: Zutphen, 1400-1600, pp. 108-126. 
101 J. TRACY, Financial Revolution, cit., ch. 5, ‗The Renteniers‘, pp. 139-192; quotations on p. 171. 
102 In assessing my most recent and successful Social Science and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada research grant application, for my project ‗Warfare, taxation, depopulation, and living 
standards in the southern Low Countries‘, one anonymous referee asserted that ‗It is not true that 
those receiving payments of the renten were only the ―rich‖.‘ See n. 1 above. 
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from that just seen in fourteenth-century Ghent. The role that renten played in 
Aalst‘s civic finances, for the period 1395-96 (first extant account) to 1550, when 
this study terminates, can be seen in Figures (graphs) 1 – 7.103 While accounts for 
some years within this long 155-year era are missing, especially in the 1490s, there 
are fewer gaps in these accounts than in the Ghent accounts; and, even more 
important, almost all of the extant Aalst accounts are fully complete, while many of 
the fourteenth-century Ghent accounts have survived in only partial form.  
 Figure 1: revenues from the annual sales of both erfelijk renten and lijfrenten, 
and as percentages of total civic revenues. 
 Figure 2: annual expenditures on both erfelijk renten and lijfrenten (annuity 
payments and redemptions); the proportional shares accounted for by each 
form of renten; and total renten payments as percentages of total civic 
expenditures. 
 Figure 3: Annual balance sheets of total revenues, total expenditures, and 
consequent surpluses or deficits, in both livres parisis and ponds groot Flemish 
(£12 parisis = £1 groot). 
 Figure 4: Total annual mean revenues from the sales of excise tax farms 
(accijnzen); annual payments for renten (both kinds) as percentages of total 
income from the tax farms and, for comparison, as percentages of total 
civic expenditures. 
 Figure 5: Annual mean revenues from the excise-tax farms on the 
consumption (sales) of wine, beer, woollen cloth, grain, and the total excise 
tax farms, in £ parisis (only), with an index based on mean values for 1451-
75, the statistical base period used throughout this study.  
 Figures 6 and 7: Total revenues from the combined sale of the wine and 
beer excise-tax farms; total revenues from the sales of all excise-tax farms; 
and the shares of total civic incomes accounted for by both the sales of 
excise-tax farms and the sales of renten, in £ parisis and groot. 
 
These seven figures together permit an interesting comparison between the 
civic finances of Ghent and Aalst (in the periods indicated). Thus if erfelijk renten 
had been the predominant form of annuities that were sold in financing the 
government of fourteenth-century Ghent  – if only to a small extent, the exact 
opposite was true for Aalst, for the 155-year period of this study, from 1395 to 
1550. Thus, lijfrenten were always vastly more important, by an almost 25:1 ratio. In 
summary, over this 155-year period, lijfrenten accounted for 96.04 percent of the 
total sales value of annuities, and thus erfelijk renten accounted for only 3.96 percent. 
Together, over this same period, the sales of all renten provided (as an annual 
average) 11.86 percent of total civic revenues, ranging from an unusual low of 0.37 
                                                          
103 Sources: Aalst Stadsrekeningen (1395-1550) in ALGMEEN RIJKSARCHIEF BRUSSEL, Rekenkamer, 
doc. nos. 31,412 - 31,553. For various reasons, I have set 1550 as the terminal date for my analysis of 
urban finances in the southern Low Countries; and I certainly saw no valid reason to go beyond 1568, 
with the outbreak of the Revolt of the Low Countries against Spanish rule, so destructive for Flanders 
and Brabant. 
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percent in 1511-15 (quinquennial mean) to a high of 25.42 percent in 1431-35 
(years of strife). Over this same 155-year period, erfelijk renten accounted for a 
correspondingly small share, 2.37 percent, of the annual payments for renten 
obligations (i.e., both annuity payments and redemptions), while the lijfrenten thus 
accounted for 97.63 percent of those annuity expenditures. The difference, albeit 
small, between the relative proportions for sales revenue and expenditures, for 
these two forms of civic annuities, is readily explained by the fact that the rate of 
return on erfelijk renten was always lower than that for lijfrenten – often only half that 
for lijfrenten; and both forms of renten evidently always had a much lower yield than 
interest on loans (information for which is understandably scarce, because of the 
usury prohibition).104 
As indicated in Figure 4, on renten-related expenditures, the annual payments for 
both kinds of renten in Aalst (for both annuity payments and redemptions) 
accounted for an annual mean of 36.47 percent of total civic expenditures, over this 
155-year period. Those shares of total civic expenditures ranged from a low 22.17 
percent, at the end our period, in 1541-45 (and only 22.27 percent in 1546-50) to a 
high of 74.65 percent in 1436-40, during the very costly and economically 
disruptive Anglo-Burgundian war.  
Of equal interest in this important Figure 4 is the relationship between 
expenditures on renten and the revenues derived from the annual sale of excise-tax 
farms on consumption: especially if we assume that the major if not exclusive 
reason for those excise taxes was to finance such annuity expenditures. Thus, renten-
related annual expenditures ranged from a low of 33.28 percent – again in 1541-45 
– to a very unusual high of 110.55 percent of the sales value of the excise-tax farms, 
again in the years of the Anglo-Burgundian war: 1436-40; but that was the only 
quinquennium in this entire period in which renten expenditures exceeded such 
income from the excise-tax farms. 
The next two Figures 5 and 6 provide more detailed information on the mean 
annual revenues from the various excise-tax farms: principally wine, beer, cloth 
(Aalst was a textile-town), and grains. It will be readily seen, as was previously 
noted, that together the wine and beer excise-tax farms usually accounted for well 
over half of the tax-farm revenues: ranging from an unusual low (in quinquennial 
means) of 44.96 percent in 1476-80 to a high of 67.95 percent in 1546-60. For the 
first half of the sixteenth century, the sum of the wine and beer tax-farms 
accounted for 63.1 percent of total excise-tax farm revenues. In the same period, as 
indicated in Figure 6, the revenues from the sales of excise-tax farms accounted for 
a mean of 78.5 percent of total civic revenues. Over the entire 150-year period, that 
share of total civic revenues accounted for by the sales of the excise-tax farms 
averaged almost the same: 74.53 percent; and it ranged from a low of 50.16 percent 
in the civil war years of 1486-90 to a high of 84.74 percent in 1446-50, virtually 
matched by the 84.58 percent share in 1526-30. 
                                                          
104 On the differences in yields on public debts in France and the medieval, early-modern Low 
Countries, see J. Munro, Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution, pp. 524-540. 
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The burden of taxation in Aalst: 1396 - 1550: a new look at the „standard of living‟ 
controversy 
The central issue of this study is a measurement of the burden of taxation – 
though only a partial measurement – in financing urban renten, specifically in later-
medieval and early-modern Flanders. The measurement of this taxation provides 
us, in turn, with another statistical mechanism to evaluate the still ongoing ‗standard 
of living‘ debate in late-medieval and early-modern western Europe (up to ca. 
1550). The major problem facing the economic historian in dealing with the 
statistical data of this era  is to convert the those ‗nominal‘ values that are expressed 
in the current money-of-account (livre parisis and pond groot) into some estimate of 
‗real‘ values, as statisticians and economists do today with current values. The 
monetary problem was, in many ways, a much bigger one for this era, from the 
mid-fourteenth to mid-sixteenth centuries, involving two separate sets of factors, 
both concerning alternating cycles of inflation and deflation, finally culminating in 
the 130-year period of sustained inflation, throughout Europe known as the ‗Price 
Revolution‘ (ca. 1520 - ca. 1650).105  
The first was coinage debasement (i.e., reductions in the precious-metal 
contents), almost always inflationary, followed by its opposite, coinage renforcements, 
usually deflationary, which provided monetary disturbances and price fluctuations 
that were far more severe in the southern Low Countries than in England, if 
generally less severe than those in late-medieval France.106 
Complicating these fluctuations in the price levels was a quite separate second 
set of factors: those that produced first monetary contraction and then monetary 
expansion. The problems of monetary contraction and consequent (further) 
deflation affected the Low Countries in three major periods: the late fourteenth, 
early fifteenth-century (ca. 1380 - ca. 1415), the mid fifteenth century (ca. 1440 - ca. 
1475), and the late fifteenth-early sixteenth century (ca. 1495 - ca. 1510). That was 
then followed by a new form of monetary expansion, involving both precious 
metals (the South-German silver mining boom) and credit (i.e., innovations in 
financial institutions), which provided the true origins of the Price Revolution, long 
before any important influxes of silver came from the Spanish Americas (and also 
before any significant demographic expansion). The nature of these various 
monetary forces, and the economic characteristics and consequences of the cycles 
                                                          
105 See J. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins of the “Price Revolution:” South German Silver Mining, Merchant-
Banking, and Venetian Commerce, 1470-1540, in Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470–1800, D. 
FLYNN, A. GIRÁLDEZ, R. VON GLAHN eds., Aldershot-Brookfield 2003 (Vt: Ashgate Publishing), 
pp. 1-34. 
106 See J. MUNRO, Wage-Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval England and the 
Low Countries, 1300-1500: Did Money Matter?, in ―Research in Economic History‖, 21, 2003, pp. 185 - 
297; IDEM, Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade 1340-1478, Brussels-
Toronto, 1973;  and various studies in IDEM, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low 
Countries, 1350-1500, Aldershot Hampshire-Brookfield Vermont 1992 (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355). 
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of inflation, deflation, and then inflation have been dealt with very extensively 
elsewhere and need not detain us further in this study.107 
The major issue that the economic historian must resolve is the proper method 
of ‗discounting‘ the effects of inflation and deflation and thus of converting 
‗nominal‘ values into ‗real values‘. In other words, a sharp rise in the aggregate value 
of the excise-tax farm revenues may be only the result of inflation and thus illusory. 
Figures 8 and 9 seek to provide that solution, and, at the same time, to provide a 
better method of measuring the burden of urban taxation in Aalst. Figure 8 
presents the mean annual values of the revenues from the sale of all the excise-tax 
farms in Aalst (with nominal values in both livres parisis and pond groot) in terms of 
fixed ‗baskets of consumables‘, similar in nature to those that statisticians compile 
today to measure the Consumer Price Index (or cost of living index). For England, 
over a period of almost seven centuries (from 1264 to 1954), this statistical 
technique was pioneered (in 1956) by the English team of Henry Phelps Brown and 
Sheila Hopkins; and it is still the most widely used method of measuring changes in 
the English price level, at least until the Industrial Revolution era.108 In essence 
their basket consists of fixed shares of foodstuffs and industrial goods: 80 percent 
and 20 percent, respectively (but the grain-weight itself – wheat, rye, barley, and 
peas – is only 20 percent). The base that they chose for their Consumer Price Index 
is the mean of all commodity prices for the quarter century 1451-1475. Obviously, 
such a weighted price index – despite many imperfections – is vastly superior to 
one based solely on wheat or rye: ‗for man lives not by bread alone‘. 
In 1975, Professor Herman Van der Wee adopted the Phelps Brown and 
Hopkins methodology, and the same statistical base (1451-75), selecting as far as 
possible the same commodities, in the same or similar quantities, to produce his 
own ‗basket of consumables‘ Consumer Price Index for the Antwerp-Lier region of 
Brabant for the three centuries from 1400 to 1700.109 I myself then followed Van 
der Wee‘s methodology to construct a ‗basket of consumables‘ Consumer Price 
Index for Flanders, from 1350 to 1500.110 Unfortunately, while there are ample 
grain prices for the following centuries, we do not possess adequate price data for 
the other commodities in this basket, either before 1350 or after 1500. To resolve 
this problem, I have utilized the Van der Wee Consumer Price Index for the first 
half of the sixteenth century (but converting prices in Brabant groten into Flemish 
groten, and using the Flemish price base of 1451-75), on the assumption that by 
1500 the market economies of Flanders and Brabant had become sufficiently 
integrated – long after their coinages had been unified (in 1433-35) – to justify this 
                                                          
107 See sources cited in nn. 105-106, above. 
108 E.H. PHELPS BROWN, SH.V. HOPKINS, Seven Centuries, cit., pp. 1-12. See n. 83 above. 
109 H. VAN DER WEE, Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen, cit., pp. 413-447. See n. 85 above. 
110 See J. MUNRO, Builders‟ Wages in Southern England and the Southern Low Countries, 1346-1500: A 
Comparative Study of Trends in and Levels of Real Incomes, in L‟Edilizia prima della rivoluzione industriale, secc. 
XIII-XVIII, ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI, Florence 2005 (Le Monnier - Atti delle ―Settimana di Studi‖ e altri 
convegni, 36, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica ―Francesco Datini‖), pp. 1013-1076; and 
IDEM, Wage-Stickiness, cit., pp. 185-297. 
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technique.  Furthermore, Aalst was fairly close to Brabant, and not so distant from 
the Antwerp market, which indeed its textile industries then served. 
One very major difference between our price indexes for the southern Low 
Countries and the Phelps Brown & Hopkins English price index must be noted. 
While the latter consists only of disembodied index numbers, with fixed 
expenditures shares for all commodities in the basket, our two price indexes can be 
expressed in both index numbers (on that same base of 1451-75) and in current 
nominal money-of-account values: i.e., in pence (d.) groot of Flanders and Brabant 
(£1.0 groot Flemish = £1.5 groot Brabant). The major benefit of this technique is that 
the commodity expenditure shares are not rigidly fixed, but vary with the changes 
in relative prices, and thus provide a better method of representing relative 
purchasing power.111  
As Figure 8 indicates, the quinquennial mean real value of the sales revenue 
from the aggregate excise-tax farms, as expressed in the number of Flemish 
‗baskets of consumables‘ of equivalent value, rose from 865.37 Flemish ‗baskets‘ in 
1396-1400 to a mid-century peak of 1,283.39 baskets – an almost 50 percent (48.3) 
increase – for the economically depressed post-Anglo-Burgundian war years of 
1441-45. Thereafter, after temporarily declining, that real tax burden rose again to a 
new peak of 1,523.48 baskets in 1471-75: i.e., 76 percent higher than in 1396-1400; 
and that peak was surpassed at the end of the century, in 1496-1500, with an excise-
tax burden of 1,593.471 baskets. In the sixteenth century, however, that excise-tax 
burden was evidently diminished, as the equivalent number of (Brabantine) ‗baskets 
of consumables‘ steadily fell to a low of 599.319 baskets in 1521-25 (only 69.25 
percent of the real tax burden in 1396-1400); but thereafter it rose to 882.57 baskets 
at the very end of our period of statistical analysis, in 1546-50, representing about 
the same tax burden as that for 1396-1400, at the beginning of our period. The 
most effective means of measuring changes in the tax burden over this 155-year 
period is the index numbers, with a base of 1451-75, for the equivalent value of the 
aggregate tax-excise farms in terms of the Flemish basket of consumables. The 
corresponding graphic line for these index numbers in Figure 8 indicates, for 
example, that the burden in 1496-1500 was 27.1 percent higher than for the base 
period, 1451-75. 
Monetary factors concerning inflation and deflation may explain some of the 
differences in these excise-tax burdens: i.e., in that nominal values of the excise 
taxes and thus of the farms were ‗sticky‘, and thus did not smoothly change with 
the rise and fall of prices. Note, for example, that the fifteenth-century peaks were 
during periods of severe deflation (except in the years of civil strife and war, in the 
1470s and 1480s). Conversely, the fall in the real values of the excise-tax farms 
during the initial phase of the Price Revolution may reflect a ‗stickiness‘ of the 
nominal tax rates during the onset of prolonged inflation. 
                                                          
111 I have in fact been able to use the working papers of the Phelps Brown and Hopkins project, 
now maintained in the Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic Science (London 
School of Economics), and have converted all of their commodity index numbers into monetary 
values (from 1264 to 1700), in pence sterling. I have also used them in my comparative study of real 
wages, in late-medieval England and the Low Countries, where I have also examined the statistical 
nature of this difference in the consumer price indexes. See IDEM, Builders‟ Wages, cit., pp. 1013-1076. 
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Figure 9 presents an even better measure of the real tax burden, especially for 
the middle and lower classes of Aalst‘s urban society: the value of the excise-tax 
revenues as expressed in the equivalent value of the number of days‘ wages for 
master masons and carpenters. These were building craftsmen who periodically 
obtained employment from the civic government for building projects, while also 
employed, in other periods of the year in institutional and other private 
construction projects. Some masters in the Aalst building trades, if by no means a 
majority, were more than just artisans. They were also industrial ‗contractors‘ and 
entrepreneurs, who often earned substantial additional incomes from trading in 
construction materials – selling building supplies to town governments, and various 
institutions, such as hospitals, churches, guilds, etc. They also generally earned much 
higher wages – which have thus been excluded from this study. Perhaps an even 
better measure might have been to use the daily wages of their journeymen helpers, 
all the more so since journeymen (knapen) earned virtually all of their income from 
wages. But, while the journeymen‘s wages in, say Bruges, were virtually always one-
half (50 percent) of the master‘s wage, they varied in Aalst from about 43 percent 
(e.g., 3d/7d) to 50 percent (e.g., 4d/8d) or 57 percent (e.g., 4d/7d).112  
Some historians, however, have contended that masons and carpenters – or 
other similar building craftsmen – are not a good choice, as representatives of 
skilled artisans, since they did not necessarily rank all that high in the hierarchy of 
urban wages.113 But that objection misses the point – which is not to present such 
wages as though they truly ‗representative‘ of the artisan labour force, and certainly 
not as the highest of such urban wages. There is one fundamental reason why most 
medieval economic historians use such builders‘ wages: because they are, for most 
towns of this era (and also English manorial estates) the only daily-wage labour 
statistics available in a verifiable and continuous series over many, many centuries.  
We must also remember that most artisans and labourers worked for piece-work 
wages (never or rarely available in such continuous series); and building craftsmen 
therefore also provide one of the few examples of daily wages, based on a working 
day from 8 hours in the winter to 12-14 hours in the summer, explaining why the 
records often distinguish between summer and winter wages.114 
Such a measurement, based on builders‘ wages, explains another very major 
reason for choosing the town accounts of Aalst: the fact that they provide, along 
with all of the aforementioned statistical data on rentes and excise-taxes, a very 
complete set of data on urban wages — providing, year after year, the wages 
(summer and winter) for specified artisans – from which I have chosen just the 
                                                          
112 On these issues, see J. MUNRO, Wage Stickiness, cit., pp. 185-297; and IDEM, Builers Wages in 
Southern England and the Low Countries, cit., pp. 1013-1076. For the Aalst wage data, see the sources for 
the figures, below. 
113 See for example: B. BLONDÉ, De sociale structuren en economische dynamiek van 's-Hertogenbosch 
1500-1550, Antwerp 1987; and also Labour and Labour Markets Between Town and Countryside, Middle Ages-
19th century, ed. B. BLONDÉ, Turnhout 2001. 
114 See J. MUNRO, Urban Wage Structures in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries: Work-Time 
and Seasonal Wages, in Labour and Leisure in Historical Perspective, Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries, ed. I. 
BLANCHARD, Stuttgart 1994 (Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft series, 
116), pp. 65-78; and IDEM, Wage-Stickiness, cit., pp. 185-297. 
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daily (summer) wages for master masons and carpenters. In contrast to these rich 
and so informative Aalst civic accounts, the Ghent accounts provide almost no 
such annual, useable wage data (except a very few years in the fourteenth century); 
and the individual wage data in the Bruges civic accounts cease in the 1480s, when 
the town treasurers chose to provide, thereafter, only the annual totals of wage 
expenditures (as do the later Ypres accounts). Conversely, while we have abundant 
wage data for Antwerp (1400-1700), we have virtually no civic records of revenues 
from excise tax farms until the later sixteenth century.115  
In Figure 9, the mean daily wages for these artisans are indicated, in pence groot 
Flemish. They range from a mean of 7.2d in 1396-1400 to a nominal peak mean of 
10.0d from the mid 1480s to the mid 1490s. For purposes of comparative analysis, 
this Figure 9 also provides the estimated annual wage income (for a mean estimated 
employment year of 210 days) for these master masons and carpenters, again, in 
terms of the equivalent number Flemish (and Brabantine) ‗baskets of consumables‘: 
i.e., the amount of real goods that these artisans could have purchased yearly with 
their money wage income. That indeed is the true meaning of the often 
misunderstood term ‗real wages‘.116 For reasons that I have supplied in depth in 
other publications, this measure of annual income in commodity baskets, along 
with the real-wage index (final column), are and must be presented in harmonic 
rather than arithmetic means.117 
The most striking feature of this Figure 9 is the very large number of days‘ 
wages, for master masons and carpenters, whose aggregate money value provides 
the equivalent value of the annual tax-farms in Aalst. That number rise from an 
annual mean of 13,205.93 days wages in 1396-1400 (62.89 years wage income) to an 
initial peak, again in those depressed post-war years of 1441-45: when the excise-tax 
burden represented 20,201.43 days‘ wages (96.2 years‘ wage income, almost a 
century) for these artisans. But that burden was subsequently exceeded consistently 
in the years from 1466 to 1485: varying from 21,640.64 days‘ wages in 1466-70 to a 
new peak of 24,419.60 days‘ wages (116.3 years‘ wage income) in 1471-75. While 
                                                          
115 For published statistics on the available wage data for late-medieval Ghent, see E. THOEN, 
Landbouwekonomie, cit., II, Part IV: ‗Loonevolutie en loonarbeid‘, pp. 941-79, especially Figure (graph) 
43, p. 950; and also Appendix XVI, pp. 1317-26. For wages of building craftsmen in Bruges, Antwerp, 
and Mechelen, see the data provided in J. MUNRO, Wage-Stickiness, cit., Tables 10-14, pp. 252-261; and 
also in IDEM, Builders‟ Wages‘ cit., Tables 3-7, pp. 1053-1066; H. VAN DER WEE, Prijzen en lonen, cit., pp. 
413-447; and in IDEM, Antwerp Market, I: Statistics, cit., pp. 383-389; Synoptic Tables of Wages and 
Appendices 27-30, pp. 393-92; for beer excise taxes in Antwerp, in scattered years only from 1560 to 
1600, see Appendix 43/5, p. 521. As Van der Wee notes (p. 510), ‗the town accounts of Antwerp have 
only been conserved in full from the last quarter of the sixteenth century ....‘. 
116 For an explanation and justification for the choice of a mean employment year of 210 days, 
see J. MUNRO, Wage-Stickiness, cit., pp. 185-297; IDEM, Builders‟ Wages, cit., pp. pp. 1013-1076; and 
especially H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of the Antwerp Market, I, Statistics, cit., Appendix 48, pp. 540-544 
(for Antwerp and Lier, in the period 1437-1600). 
117 The harmonic mean is ‗the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of the reciprocals of the 
individual numbers in a given series‘; and it is always somewhat less than the arithmetic mean. For the 
statistical explanation, see F.C. MILLS, Introduction to Statistics, New York 1956, pp. 108-112, 401. For an 
explanation of why harmonic and not arithmetic means must be used in such historical studies, see, J. 
MUNRO, Builders‟ Wages, cit., pp. 1027-1028. 
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falling somewhat in the 1480s, but only because of a rise in nominal money wages, 
that tax burden again rose (to 21,442.91 days‘ wages in 1496-1500) and never fell 
below 20,000 days‘ wages in the first two decades of the sixteenth century, 
thereafter rising to a new and final peak of 29,949.60 days‘ wages (142.6 years‘ 
wages) in the final quinquennium of this study, 1546-50. The principal reason for 
this rising tax burden on such artisans should be obvious as well from Figure 9: the 
fact that nominal money wages did not rise to keep pace with inflation, and 
sometimes even fell, during this first phase of the Price Revolution, while, at the 
same time, the nominal value of the excise taxes did rise, if not as much as the price 
level, at least more in accordance with inflation. 
For the early fifteenth century, when, as noted earlier, Aalst had between 3,600 
and 4,000 inhabitants, this highly regressive excise-tax burden must have been a 
very heavy one indeed for adult master artisans, let alone their far less well paid 
journeymen labourers.118 However, that tax burden appears to have been far less 
draconian, if measured on a per capita basis (for a population of 3,600): thus 
ranging from 3.668 days‘ wages in 1396-1400 to the onerous peak of 8.319 days‘ 
wages in 1546-50. If instead we measure the burden in terms of the estimated 
number of employed adult males (taken as one-quarter of that population), the 
burden correspondingly rises from 14.673 days‘ wages in 1396-1400 to 33.277 days‘ 
wages in 1546-1550: i.e., with a work-week of six days, about 5.5 weeks‘ wages.  
One may now ask if there were any alternative forms of late-medieval taxation 
that were less regressive than these urban excise taxes, which were obviously an 
indirect tax. For my research indicates that this was indeed, as to be expected, the 
almost exclusive form of taxation used to finance annuity (rente) payments in late-
medieval Flemish towns, and elsewhere. Let us also recall that the various papal 
edicts that had accepted rentes as non-usurious contracts had virtually stipulated this 
very form of taxation in financing annuities. The alternative form of taxation to be 
found in many other jurisdictions was, of course, direct taxes, of which the most 
predominant form was a property tax: both hearth taxes (on residences) in towns 
and villages, and a land tax on rural estates and farms. These were certainly far less 
regressive in that their assessments were based to some degree on market values, so 
that those with more expensive properties paid more taxes (normally a larger share 
of their incomes) than did those with cheaper properties. Furthermore, as indicated 
in Table 1, on populations and taxes in fifteenth-century Brabant, those families 
considered sufficiently indigent to be classed as ‗poor hearths‘ escaped this taxation 
entirely, while even the poorest who consumed bread and beer, etc., had to pay the 
excise taxes. Note in particular, in this table, the rise in the proportion of tax-
exempt ‗poor hearths‘ in the duchy of Brabant (combined with demographic 
decline), between 1437 and 1480, especially in the smaller towns: from 9.2 percent 
in 1437 to 28.1 percent of total hearths in 1480 (no data for 1496). This provides 
yet another statistical indicator to challenge the commonplace notion of a ‗Golden 
Age‘ of artisans (and peasants) in the fifteenth century.  
Another recent study on Flemish taxation – taxation in the Flemish 
countryside, from the late thirteenth to eighteenth centuries – now permits us to 
                                                          
118 For Aalst‘s population, see note 92 above. 
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make another and most valuable comparative observation.119 As Tim Soens and 
Erik Thoen have demonstrated, the levels of taxation – direct taxation – were far, 
far lower in the Flemish countryside, and much less regressive, at least before the 
seventeenth century; and, furthermore, they have concluded that very few if any 
rural inhabitants purchased urban commodities subject to these excise taxes. Beer, 
for examples, was a widespread object of production and consumption in rural 
households, as were most foodstuffs.120 Thus, if the tax burden between town and 
countryside widened in the later middle ages and sixteenth century, that gap may 
have provided yet another incentive for some artisans to seek industrial 
employment in the countryside: a contention that is indeed widespread in the now 
extensive literature on the ‗proto-industrialisation‘ debate.121 
The late-medieval „standard of living‟ debate: the role of demographic and monetary factors 
The evidence in these  figures, especially Figure 9, provides us – as promised 
earlier – with important new insights into the ongoing controversy about real 
incomes and living standards in late-medieval western Europe, especially after the 
Black Death. The still prevailing opinion amongst medieval economic historians, 
deeply influenced by the Postan and Duby schools, using fundamentally a Ricardian 
model, is that the Black Death and subsequent, if periodic, declines in population, 
amounting to perhaps 40 percent by the fifteenth century, so altered the land:labour 
ratio that the marginal productivity of labour ‗must‘ have risen substantially, as did, 
therefore, real wages.122 For, according to Classical economic theory, the real wage 
is determined by the marginal product of labour – though more precisely it is 
determined by its marginal revenue product. For an even simpler explanation, one may 
contend that such a decline in population and thus in aggregate demand led to the 
abandonment of relatively infertile, high-cost ‗marginal lands‘, so that the 
                                                          
119 T. SOENS, E. THOEN, The Impact of Central Government Taxation on the Flemish Countryside (end 
13th-18th Centuries): Some Reflections, in La fiscalità nell‟economia europea, Seccoli XIII - XVIII/Fiscal Systems in 
the European Economy from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI, Florence 2008 (XXXIX 
Settimana di Studi), pp. 957-971. 
120 See E. AERTS, Bier van Lier, cit.; J. M. BENNETT, Ale, Beer and Brewsters in England: Women's 
Work in a Changing World, 1300-1600, Oxford 1996. 
121 See, for example: F. MENDELS, Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization Process, 
in ―The Journal of Economic History‖, 32, March 1972, pp. 241-261; D.C. COLEMAN, Proto-
Industrialization: A Concept Too Many, in ―The Economic History Review‖, 2nd ser., 36, August 1983, 
pp. 435-448; L.A. CLARKSON, Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of Industrialization?, London 1985 
(Studies in Economic and Social History Series), pp. 9-57; E. SCHREMMER, Proto-Industrialisation: A Step 
Towards Industrialisation?, in ―The Journal of European Economic History‖, 10, 1981, pp. 653-670; 
European Proto-Industrialization, S.C. OGILVIE, M. CERMAN eds., Cambridge 1996; P. KRIEDTE, H. 
MEDICK, J. SCHLUMBOHM, Industrialization Before Industrialization, Cambridge 1977. 
122 See M. POSTAN, Some Economic Evidence of Declining Population in the Later Middle Ages, in ―The 
Economic History Review‖, 2nd ser., 2, 1950, pp. 130-167, reprinted in his Essays on Medieval 
Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy, Cambridge 1973, pp. 186-213 (with the revised 
title of Some Agrarian Evidence of Declining Population in the Later Middle Ages); IDEM, The Medieval Economy 
and Society: An Economic History of Britain, 1100-1500, Cambridge 1972; G. DUBY, Rural Economy and 
Country Life in the Medieval West, trans. Cynthia Postan, London 1962, pp. 289-360. See also the next note. 
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foodstuffs needed to feed such a smaller population were largely produced at much 
lower costs on lands that were far more fertile, and closer to markets (and thus with 
lower Ricardian economic rent). Since the living standards of the later-medieval 
urban lower classes were largely determined by food prices – accounting for about 
80 percent of household budgets, as indicated earlier – those lower agricultural 
costs and thus food prices, and (presumably) lower rents would largely explain the 
rise in their real wages and thus also in their real incomes. 
In several publications on real incomes in late-medieval England and the Low 
Countries, I have challenged these theoretical notions, which I find simplistic and 
unhistorical.123 In particular, I have sought to demonstrate that real wages for urban 
craftsmen generally fell – not rose – in the aftermath of the Black Death, for about 
three decades, when inflation and the real cost of living rose more than did money-
wages. By the late fourteenth century, in both regions, real wages had not only 
recovered from the pre-1340 levels, but then experienced a sustained rise to reach 
an unprecedented peak in the mid fifteenth century. I had contended that this 
ultimate rise in real wages is chiefly explained, not by changes in labour 
productivity, but by the combination of sustained deflation and institutional ‗wage 
stickiness‘. Thus, with deflation and the even sharper fall in the cost of living, the 
purchasing power of stable (‗sticky‘) money wages rose, especially in England but 
also in the southern Low Countries (both Flanders and Brabant) during especially 
the mid fifteenth century: from the mid 1440s to the mid 1470s, and peaking in 
both principalities in the quinquennium 1461-65. But otherwise, in the fifteenth 
century (except for the late 1490s), real wages suffered a very considerable 
deterioration, chiefly because of warfare, coinage debasements, and consequent 
inflations. In this current study, Figure 9, on nominal and real wages in Aalst, 
provides additional evidence for this thesis. Note the long-term ‗wage stickiness‘ 
for building craftsmen in Aalst (if not quite as ‗sticky‘ as builders‘ wages in Bruges, 
Mechelen, and Antwerp);124 and note therefore that in Aalst, as elsewhere in the 
southern Low Countries, real wages rose only when consumer prices fell, and thus 
fell when those consumer prices rose. 
England, however, enjoyed a more prolonged and continuous, if by no means 
fully continuous, rise in real wages from the later fourteenth century into the early 
sixteenth century, principally because of a highly unusual degree of monetary 
stability: first between 1351 and 1464, when Edward IV debased the silver coinage 
by 20 percent; and thereafter from 1465 until 1526 (with Henry VIII‘s first if 
relatively minor debasement).125 Partly because of that difference, real wages in 
southern England, whose level, on the eve of the Black Death, had been only about 
50 percent of those in urban Flanders (Bruges and Ghent), had risen rose to about 
                                                          
123 For the following, see in particular J. MUNRO, Wage-Stickiness, cit., pp. 185-297; and IDEM, 
Builders‟ Wages, cit., pp. 1013-1076. For another valuable perspective, specifically on Flanders, see E. 
THOEN, Landbouwekonomie, cit., I, part II: ‗Het algemeen kader van prijzen en levensduurte‘, pp. 234-299. 
124 See J. MUNRO,Wage-Stickiness, cit., pp. 185-297; and IDEM, Builders‟ Wages, cit., pp. 1013-1076. 
125 See the sources cited in nn 105-106, and 123-24, above. 
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80 per cent of the urban Flemish level by the 1480s, when, as also noted earlier, the 
Bruges wage data cease to be presented in the annual town accounts.126 
But even some of those who still accept the view that the Black Death 
ultimately ushered in a ‗golden age‘ for the artisan and labourer do evince some 
doubts.127 Thus Ralph Davis has asserted that while, in late-medieval Europe, ‗the 
most powerful upward regulator of income per head was a calamitous drop in 
population‘, nevertheless ‗the economy of modern Europe would never have come 
into existence on the basis of population decline‘.128 Of course, several economic 
historians have argued that the late-medieval population decline did not occur 
peacefully; that the ravages of plagues and warfare that accompanied and directly or 
indirectly explain the population decline were extremely disruptive to the economy, 
especially to trade and commerce. We must also take account of the extremely high 
levels of physical violence, apart from warfare, in late-medieval society, especially in 
the Low Countries. In this region, the homicide rates were about 45 - 47 per 
100,000 persons in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (vs. a rate of 23 in late-
medieval England), compared to just 0.9 per 100,000 in the Netherlands and 
Belgium during the late twentieth century.129 The Nobel-prize winning economist 
Douglass North has more clearly discerned the key issues about the late-medieval 
European economies than have most historians, in stating that:130  
The decline of population, coupled with war, confiscation, pillage and revolution, reduced 
the volume of trade and stimulated a trend toward local self-sufficiency. The losses to society 
due to the decline in specialization and reduced division of labor certainly argues against a rise 
in the standard of living. This change was synonymous with increased transaction costs from 
                                                          
126 See the evidence in nn. 123-24, above. 
127 For the original ‗Golden Age‘ view, though more correctly placed well after the Black Death, 
see J.E. THOROLD ROGERS, Six Centuries of Work and Wages: the History of English Labour, London 1903, 
p. 326: ‗the fifteenth century and the first quarter of the sixteenth were the Golden Age of the English 
labourer, if we are to interpret the wages which he earned by the cost of the necessities of life.‘ See 
also, and from this same era, G.F. STEFFEN, Studien zur Geschichte der englischen Lohnarbeiter, I-III, 
Stuttgart 1901-05. 
128 R. DAVIS, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies, London 1973, p. 16. 
129 T.R. GURR, Historical Trends in Violent Crime: a Critical Review of the Evidence, in ―Crime and 
Justice: An Annual Review of Research‖, 3, 1981, pp. 295-353, esp. pp. 312-315, asserting that ‗there 
was a tremendous upsurge in violent crime in England (or at least in its cities) during the early 
fourteenth century‘, i.e., well before the Black Death (with homicide rates of about 23/100,000). See 
also M. EISNER, Long-Term Historical Trends in Violent Crime, in ―Crime and Justice: A Review of 
Research‖, 30, 2003, pp. 83-242, esp. Table 1, p. 99; for Europe as a whole, homicide rates dropped 
from a peak of 41 per 100,000 in the 15th century, to 1.4 in the 20th century (Table 2, p. 99); D. 
NICHOLAS, Crime and Punishment in Fourteenth-Century Ghent, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire/ 
Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis‖, 48, 1970, pp. 289-334, 1141-1176; reprinted in 
IDEM, Trade, Urbanisation and the Family, Aldershot 1996 (Variorum Collected Studies Series CS531, 
Ashgate Publishing:), no. VI [same pagination], esp. pp. 314-16, 1176: ‗Crime was not the 
assassination of one‘s neighbor, but the failure to offer suitable atonement to his kindred‘. 
130 D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge 1973, 
pp. 71-96 (quotation on p. 78), 93; 134-138; D. NORTH, Structure and Change in Economic History, New 
York 1981, chapters 1-5; IDEM, Government and the Cost of Exchange in History, in “Journal of Economic 
History”, 44, 1984, pp. 255-264; IDEM, Transaction Costs in History, in ―Journal of European Economic 
History”, 14, 1985, pp. 557-576. 
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using the market, a change which increased the incentives for independent groups to rely upon 
the coercive powers of government to organize economic activity. 
To this we may add two very specific coercive powers of government: greatly 
increased taxation and coinage debasements, which are also, of course, a major 
form of taxation that so many medieval princes utilized, above all in financing 
warfare.131 
Demographic changes and the burden of taxation 
What has not so far been clearly specified is the very adverse economic 
consequences in the relationship between depopulation and taxes, especially excise 
taxes. Thus the increasingly expensive warfare of late-thirteenth and early 
fourteenth-century western Europe, i.e., even before the even more expensive 
Hundred Years‘ War (1337-1453), created an ever increasing mountain of public 
debt (hence the Italian term, the monte) whose financial burdens had to be borne by 
a greatly reduced number of survivors, for no governments could afford to 
repudiate public debts and the interest or annuity payments that an ever smaller 
urban citizenry had to finance principally through consumption taxes. The fact that 
the level of excise taxes did not appreciably change in Bruges and Ghent after the 
Black Death had led the famed Belgian historian Hans Van Werveke to believe that 
the Black Death had largely spared mid-fourteenth century Flanders.132 He 
evidently did not consider the alternative: that a plague-reduced urban population 
had to bear, as well, a significant increase in the per capita burden of taxation, at a 
substantial cost to its living standards.133 
Thus the most serious and most misleading deficiency in this late-medieval 
standard of living debate, especially for urban society, has been the failure to take 
into account, in proper quantitative fashion, the role of taxation: in particular steep 
increases in excise or consumption taxes for the lower middle and working classes 
in towns of the southern Low Countries. What is also especially revealing about  
Figures 8 and 9 is the contradictory evidence about real wages for master masons 
and carpenters in Aalst: that when, in the mid-fifteenth century, they supposedly 
experienced a rise in their real wages, as computed by the normal method – i.e., by 
dividing the nominal money wage index by the consumer price index (RWI = 
NWI/CPI) – these artisans and their labourers also experienced a steep rise in the 
burden of the excise taxes. In so far as the real incomes of the Aalst building 
                                                          
131 See my publications on coinage debasements and princely finances in n. 106 above. 
132 H. VAN WERVEKE, De Zwarte Dood in de zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1349-1351, in ―Mededelingen 
van de koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor wetenschappen, letteren, en schone kunsten van België, 
Klasse der Letteren‖, XII, 1950, no. 3. See the next note. 
133 For a very cogent and convincing rebuttal of Van Werveke‘s thesis, though not involving 
these specific issues, see W. BLOCKMANS, The Social and Economic Effects of Plague in the Low Countries, 
1349-1500, in ―Belgish tijdschrift voor philologie en geschiedenis/ Revue belge de philologie et 
d'histoire”, 58, 1980, pp. 833-563. See also G. DESPY, La „Grande Peste Noire de 1348‟: a-t-elle touché le 
roman pays de Brabant?, in Centenaire du seminaire d'histoire médiévale de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1876-
1976 ed. IDEM, Brussels 1977, pp. 195-217. 
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craftsmen are being measured, in this study, in terms the number of ‗baskets of 
consumables‘ that could have been purchased with annual money wage incomes, 
one may wonder if any of these excise taxes had been included in the prices of the 
commodities contained in these baskets. If they had been, that presumably would 
have been true only for those that were sold as final products, at retail outlets: such 
as butter, cheese, meat, fish, and textiles. The major items in the baskets, by value, 
were primary commodities, such as grains, and thus were not subject to these excise 
taxes, which would have been imposed instead on the products manufactured from 
them: e.g., bread and beer (whose wholesale or retail prices are not in the price 
indexes, but only their grain components). Furthermore, of these commodities just 
listed, only textiles figured prominently in the total value of all the Aalst excise-tax 
farms. 
The issue of excise taxes also adds yet another dimension to the comparison of 
the actual levels of real wages in England and the Southern Low Countries: a factor 
that may well have narrowed the statistically evident gap between the real wages for 
urban building craftsmen even more, in these two countries. For England, unlike 
almost all of the continent (or continental towns), had experienced few significant  
internal taxes on consumption – as opposed to import duties – until as late as July 
1643, when the Long Parliament, under the leadership of John Pym, shortly after 
the outbreak of the Civil War between Crown and Parliament, introduced this 
continental form of excise taxes.134 By the late eighteenth century (and presumably 
much earlier), the sum of excise and import-customs duties on such consumables 
accounted for 78.8 percent of the ‗Major Taxes‘ (accounting for over 90 percent of 
total taxes), while direct taxation (chiefly the land tax) account for only 21.2 
percent.135 
Of course a major reason why such excise taxes had not been necessary before 
the mid-seventeenth century was the very high level of revenue that the English 
crown had gained for centuries from both export taxes, chiefly on wool and cloth, 
and the land taxes, along with such direct taxes as the levies of ‗fifteenths and 
tenths‘136 It is also interesting to note that an experiment in a progressive income 
                                                          
134 See M. ASHLEY, Financial and Commercial Policy Under the Cromwellian Protectorate, Oxford 1934; 
revised edn: London 1962 (Frank Cass and Co. Ltd), chapter VII: ‗Taxes, ii. Excise‘, pp. 62-71; P. 
O‘BRIEN, P. HUNT, The Emergence and Consolidation of Excises in the English Fiscal System before the Glorious 
Revolution, in ―British Tax Review 1997‖ [42, 1997], pp. 35-58, noting, on pp. 38-41 (with Table 1) that 
there were a few inland duties collected on goods traded within the realm – e.g., coal, alum, salt, 
copperas, soap; P. O‘BRIEN, Political Economy of British Taxation, cit., pp. 1-32; W. ASHWORTH, Customs 
and Excise: Trade, Production and Consumption in England, 1640–1845, Oxford 2003. Such taxation, of 
course, also helped make possible England‘s ‗financial revolution‘, following the 1688 ‗Glorious 
Revolution‘. See n. 2 above. 
135 P. O‘BRIEN, Political Economy of British Taxation, cit., pp. 8-17, esp. Table 5, p. 11 (but based on 
my calculations from that table). 
136 See J.  MUNRO, Medieval Woollens: Textiles, Textile Technology, and Industrial Organisation, c. 800-
1500, in The Cambridge History of Western Textiles, ed. D. JENKINS, I-II, Cambridge-New York 2003, I, 
pp. 181-227; W.M. ORMROD, The Crown and the English Economy, 1290-1348, in Before the Black Death: 
Studies in „Crisis‟ of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B.M.S. CAMPBELL, Manchester 1991, pp. 149-183. 
Even in 1640, over 90 percent of the value of English exports came from wool and textiles. For 
London‘s finances in this period, see V. HARDING, The Crown, the City, and the Orphans: the City of 
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tax, undertaken by Henry VIII, in the period 1513-1547, did not survive the reign 
of Elizabeth I (1558-1603).137 At the same time, it must be observed that English 
import customs duties on wine, and then from 1660s, in the ensuing era of the so-
called ‗New Colonialism‘, customs duties on such colonial imports as tea, sugar, 
rum, tobacco, linens, Indian cottons, timber, and iron, provided a consumption-tax 
burden that was equivalent in nature to urban excise taxes in continental towns.138 
It must here be stressed once more that in both these countries, and indeed in 
most of western Europe, excise taxes were principally, perhaps almost exclusively, 
an urban form of taxation, and thus may be used in comparing only urban 
industrial wages. But we lack sufficient data on most of the other taxes, just as we 
lack full data on urban household incomes, for which women (wives, daughters, 
resident widows) were presumably also important contributors, especially after the 
Black Death, in any attempt to measure inter-regional urban differences in ‗after-
tax‘ real incomes in later-medieval, early-modern western Europe.139 Unfortunately, 
for Aalst in particular, we lack any significant data on female incomes, even for the 
important woollen textile industry, for which over 60 percent of the employment 
was probably then female (earning piece-work incomes).140 
But the plight of these urban artisan and labouring consumers may have been 
even worse, since these statistics do not take account of the per capita burden: i.e., of 
the effects population decline throughout the fifteenth century. Another common 
mistaken belief concerning medieval demography is that western Europe suffered a 
major fall in population only after the first phase of Black Death (from 1348, and 
into the 1360s), and the corresponding belief that Europe‘s population began to 
recover from at least the mid fifteenth century. 
Recent studies indicate however, for both the southern Low Countries (except 
the Antwerp region) and England, that general demographic recovery did not 
                                                          
London and its Finances, 1400-1700, in Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in 
Western Europe (14th-18th Centuries), M. BOONE, K. DAVIDS, P. JANSSENS eds., Turnout 2003, pp. 51-60. 
137 R. SCHOFIELD, Taxation Under the Early Tudors, 1485–1547, Oxford 2004. 
138 See P. O‘BRIEN, Political Economy of British Taxation, cit., Table 5, p. 11; and other sources cited 
in n. 134 above. 
139 See P.J. AND P. GOLDBERG, Women, Work, and Life Cycle in a Medieval Economy: Women in York 
and Yorkshire, c.1300–1520, Oxford 1992; S. BARDSLEY, Women‟s Work Reconsidered: Gender and Wage-
Differentiation in Late Medieval England, in ―Past & Present‖, 165, Nov. 1999, pp. 3-29; L. SOLTOW, 
Income and Wealth Inequality in the Netherlands, 16th-20th Century, Amsterdam 1998; T. DE MOOR, J. LUITEN 
VAN ZANDEN, Vrouwen en de geboorte van het kapitalism in West-Europa, Meppel 2006; J. LUITEN VAN 
ZANDEN, Wages and the Standard of Living in Europe, 1500-1800, in ―European Review of Economic 
History‖, 3, Aug. 1999, pp. 175-197, in which he states (p. 178): ‗This [artisan‘s household] budget is 
made up of different sources of income, of which wage income is only one. But we assume it was an 
important source (and not a marginal one) for the European working classes of the early modern 
period. Moreover, the wage rate is exogenous for the household: it cannot influence its level in the 
short or the long run. This means that a rationally acting household will adapt its strategy to this given 
wage-level‘: i.e., will adjust the family‘s non-wage forms of income accordingly. 
140 See J. MUNRO, Medieval Woollens, cit., pp. 181-227: especially in wool-sorting, wool-preparation 
(cleansing and greasing), combing, card, spinning, warping (on the loom); while weaving, fulling, 
dyeing, and shearing were essentially male occupations. 
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commence until the early sixteenth century, perhaps not until the 1520s.141 As 
Table 1 indicates, for the population of Brabant, the recorded number of ‗hearths‘ 
for the entire duchy fell by 18.76 percent, from 1437 to 1496, despite the very 
significant (and expected) growth of Antwerp (by 91.5 percent), which became the 
commercial and financial capital of Europe from the 1460s. The population decline 
was the most severe for the small towns (i.e., those like Aalst) and villages, whose 
number of hearths fell by 25.14 and 26.35 percent, respectively. Finally, if we 
assume that population decline consists not just in the disappearance of households 
but also in a smaller average family size of those that survived, the demographic 
decline may have been much more serious than these grim data would indicate. 
Unfortunately, we lack any such comparable demographic data for Aalst 
(nothing beyond that already presented), but, thanks to Erik Thoen and Peter 
Stabel, we do have information on significant demographic decline for some 
fifteenth-century Flemish towns. For example, Hulst‘s population (about the same 
as that of Aalst) had fallen from 3,600 in 1417 to 3,000 in 1469, a decline of about 
17 percent. From the mid-fourteenth to the mid or later fifteenth century, the 
population of Dendermonde had fallen by about one half: from about 9,000 to 
about 4,500. But Kortrijk seems to have maintained a stable population of about 
5,300 from 1440 to 1477; and Oudenaarde‘s population (with a thriving tapestry 
industry) actually grew from 5,700 in the 1440s to 6,200 in about 1500.142 Perhaps 
the worst Flemish demographic crisis took place in Ypres (Ieper), whose traditional 
woollen cloth industry suffered a greater decline than that of any other major 
Flemish city during the fifteenth century. According to estimates of Henri Pirenne, 
though disputed by some historians, Ypres‘ population had fallen from 10,523 in 
1431 to 7,626 in 1491: a decline of 27.53 percent (but thereafter recovering to 9,563 
in 1506).143  
Whether or not Aalst had suffered any demographic decline in the fifteenth 
century cannot, regrettably, be ascertained with any certainty.144 If it did, then these 
                                                          
141 For England, see B.. CAMPBELL, The Population of Early Tudor England: A Re-evaluation of the 
1522 Muster Returns and the 1524 and 1525 Lay Subsidies, in ―Journal of Historical Geography‖, 7, 1981, 
pp. 145-154; J. CORNWALL, English Population in the Early Sixteenth Century, in ―Economic History 
Review‖, 2nd ser., 23, 1970, 1, pp. 32-44; I. BLANCHARD, Population Change, Enclosure, and the Early 
Tudor Economy, in ―Economic History Review‖, 2nd ser., 23, 1970, 3, pp. 427-445. 
142 See E. THOEN, Landbouwekonomie, cit., I, pp. 1-233; P. STABEL, Kleine stad, cit., pp. 17-24; IDEM, 
Dwarfs among Giants, cit., pp. 38-43. According to estimates put forth by W. PREVENIER, La démographie 
des villes du comté de Flandre aux XIVe et XVe siècles: État de question: essai d‟interpretation, in ―Revue du 
Nord”,  65, no. 257, 1983, pp. 255-275, especially Table D (p. 264);  Kortrijk had a population of 
9,517 in 1469 (based on the Burgundian census); and Oudenaarde then had a population of 7,290. All 
of his estimates seem to be unduly high, and based on a high multiplier of 4.5 persons per household. 
143 H. PIRENNE, Les dénombrements de la population d‟Ypres au XVe siècle (1412-1506), in 
―Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte‖, 1903, republished in IDEM, Histoire économique 
de l‟occident médiéval, ed. E. COORNAERT, Bruges 1951, pp. 458-488, especially p. 467 (also presenting 
alternative figures of 10,736 inhabitants in 1412 and 9,390 in 1437). But see W. PREVENIER, La 
démographie, cit., who provides slightly different alternative estimates for Ypres‘ 1412 population: 
10,782 and 10,489 inhabitants (pp. 259-60); and an estimate of perhaps 9,878 in 1469 (Table G, p. 
270: 2,195 hearths with an average family size of 4.5 persons). 
144 P. STABEL, Dwarfs among Giants, cit., pp. 38-43; he believes that Aalst enjoyed relative 
demographic stability during the 15th century; W. PREVENIER, La démographie, cit., Table D, p. 264, 
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data on the burden of excise taxes in Figures 8 and 9 still provide a very grim 
picture; and of course if there had been demographic decline, the per capita tax 
burden would have risen commensurately, with very possibly very significant 
reductions in real incomes for the urban working classes.145 On the other hand, the 
urban excise-tax burden was not entirely negative for craftsmen and labourers in 
the building trades: for such taxes also financed much of their employment, in 
urban public works. 
                                                          
provides an estimate of Aalst‘s population in 1469 (extrapolated from the Burgundian census of that 
year): 3,962 inhabitants, about the same as other estimates for 1400. See n. 92 above. 
145 Conversely, of course, the evident growth in Aalst‘s population by the mid sixteenth century 
would have reduced the per capita tax burden indicated in Figure 9. 
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Table 1.  Population Decline and Poverty in the Duchy of Brabant, 1437–1496. 
The number of family hearths (households) and percentage of hearths without taxable 
income: (‗poor hearths‘) in 1437, 1480, and 1496 
Area of Census 1437 1437 1480 1480 1496 1496 Percentage 
in the duchy of 
Brabant 
no. of hearths per cent 
poor 
hearths 
no. of 
hearths 
per cent 
poor 
hearths 
no. of 
hearths 
per cent 
poor 
hearths 
change from 
1437 to 
1496 
        
Brussels 
 
6,376 10.5 7,414 7.9 5,750 17.1 -9.82% 
        
Antwerp 3,440 13.5 5,450 10.5 6,586 12.5 91.45% 
 
        
Leuven 3,579 7.6 3,933 18.3 3,069 n.a. -14.25% 
 
        
s'Hertogen-bosch 2,883 10.4 2,930 7.9 3,456 n.a. 19.88% 
 
        
Sub-total  
Large Towns 
 
16,278 
 
10.5 
 
19,727 
 
14.8 
 
18,861 
 
n.a. 
 
 
15.87% 
        
Small Towns 14,159 9.2 12,216 28.1 10,600 n.a. -25.14% 
 
        
Villages 
 
62,301 29.7 54,540 31.6 45,882 n.a. -26.35% 
        
 
Total Duchy 
 
 
92,738 
 
23.4 
 
86,483 
 
27.3 
 
75,343 
 
n.a. 
 
-18.76% 
 
Source: J. CUVLIER, Les dénombrements de foyers en Brabant, XIV-XVI siècle, I-II, Brussels 1912-13, I, pp. 
432-433, 446-447, 462-477, 484-487; and also pp. cxxxv, clxxvii-viii, ccxxiii-xviii. 
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Figure 1.  Sales of Renten (Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten) 
and Total Civic Revenues in Aalst 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
Values in Livres Parisis:  £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish: 
 
Source: ALGEMEEN RIJKSARCHIEF BELGIË (ARCHIVES GENERALES DU ROYAUME - ARB), 
Rekenkamer/ Chambre de Comptes, reg. 31,412 - 31,532. 
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Figure 2. Expenditures on Renten (Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten) and Total Civic 
Expenditures in Aalst, 
1396-1400 to 1546-1550, in quinquennial means 
Values in Livres Parisis:  £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish: 
 
Source: ARB, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  31,412 - 31,532. 
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Figure 3.  Total Civic Revenues and  Civic Expenditures, in Aalst 
1396-1400 to 1546-1550 , in quinquennial means 
Values in Livres Parisis:  £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish: 
 
Source: ARG, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  31,412 - 31,532. 
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Figure 4.  Total Excise Tax Farm Revenues and Total Expenditures on Renten 
(Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten) in Aalst: 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
Values in Livres Parisis:  £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish 
 
Source: ARB, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg. 31,412 - 31,532. 
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Figure 5.  Revenues from the Sale of Excise Tax Farms in Aalst: on beer, wine, and 
total consumer products taxes, 1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
Values in Livres Parisis:  £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish 
 
Source: ARB, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  31,412 - 31,532. 
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Figure 6.  Total Excise Taxes on Alcohol, Total Excise Tax Farms, and Total Civic 
Revenues, in Aalst 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
Values in Livres Parisis:  £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish 
 
Source: ARB, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg. 31,412 - 31,532. 
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Figure 7.  Values of the Sale of Renten (Erfelijk and Lijfrenten), Total Values of the 
Tax Farms, and Total Civic Revenues in Aalst, 1396 – 1400 to 1546-1550 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
Values in Livres Parisis:  £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish 
 
Source: ARB, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg. 31,412 - 31,532. 
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Figure 8.  Mean Values of Excise Tax Farms, expressed in Pounds Groot Flemish 
and in the Number of Consumer Baskets,  
with the Flemish Price Index (1451-75 = 100) and Indexes for the Excise Tax Farms 
as valued in Flemish Consumer Baskets, in Aalst 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
 
Sources: ARB, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg. 31,412 - 31,532;  H. VAN DER WEE, Prijzen en lonen 
als ontwikkelingsvariabelen:  Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400-1700, 
in Album aangeboden aan Charles Verlinden ter gelegenheid van zijn dertig jaar professoraat, Wetteren 1975 
(Universum), pp. 413-447; reissued in English translation (without the tables) as Prices and Wages as 
Development Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700, in ―Acta 
Historiae Neerlandicae‖, 10, 1978, pp. 58-78; republished in H. VAN DER WEE, The Low Countries in the 
Early Modern World, trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman, Cambridge-New York 1993 (Cambridge University 
Press and Variorum), pp. 223-241; Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires en Flandre et en 
Brabant/Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, I CH. VERLINDEN, E. 
SCHOLLIERS et al. eds., I-IV, Bruges 1959-65 (Rijksuniversiteit te Gent: Werken Uitgegeven door de 
Faculteit van de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte‖, 125 [vol. I], 136 [vol. II/i], 137 [Vol.II/ii]). 
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Figure 9.  Excise Tax Farm Revenues and Masons’ Wages in Aalst: 
Nominal and Real Wages 
Excise Tax Farm Revenues expressed in pounds groot Flemish  
and in masons’  wage incomes 
The Excise Tax Burden Expressed as the equivalent number of years  
of masons’ wages in Aalst 
Aalst nominal and real wage indexes:  mean of 1451-75 = 100 
with annual wage incomes expressed as the equivalent number of baskets of 
consumable (purchasable by that wage income) 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
 
Sources: ARB, Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532; H. VAN DER WEE, Prijzen 
en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen, cit.; Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires en Flandre, cit. 
 
